

INTRODUCTION

The overall objective of this study was to obtain an overview of the achievement of strategic objectives set in the national integration programme and of progress in the integration process in three basic spheres of integration: linguistic-communicative, legal-political and social-economic integration, and to evaluate the achievement of these objectives in comparison with the results of monitoring carried out in previous years.

A public opinion poll was carried out during the time period of January 20th – February 1 in cooperation with the social and market research company Saar Poll. The poll was nation-wide, with the participation of 1000 respondents between the ages of 15–74. In addition to the primary random sample, an additional 200 Russians from Estonia between the ages of 15–29 were interviewed separately. The Integration Foundation commissioned the study. A research team consisting of Marje Pavelson, Ivi Proos, Iris Pettai, Jüri Kruusvall, Klara Hallik and Raivo Vetik analysed the results.

In summary it can be concluded that both positive and negative developments have taken place within the framework of the integration process in both of the large nationality groups, Estonians and Estonian Russians. The study indicates that the indexes of social-economic success of Estonian Russians are approaching those of Estonians. Thus the movement of young Estonian Russians into specialist positions and their relatively large rate of employment as skilled labourers in place of their earlier employment as unskilled labourers and assistants are noticeable.

Being a member of the citizenry is an important channel of collective identity for Estonian Russians. A total of 60% of Russian speaking respondents (69% of young people) identify themselves with Estonian citizens. The efforts of Russian speaking young people to identify with the nation of Estonia are supported to a great extent by the fact that 90% of citizens and stateless young people do not identify themselves with Russians living in Russia. Even three quarters of young Russian citizens do not do so.

Yet at the same time, the transition of Russian language grammar schools to bilingual teaching frightens the Russian community because it is not known with what speed Russian language schools will convert to teaching in Estonian, to what extent Russian schools will have opportunities to choose the speed of transition, and to what extent the transfer will be covered by the necessary resources. A total of 57% of Estonian Russians fear a possible loss of identity in Russian young people and only 34% support school reform.

The monitoring study indicates that the distancing of Estonians and primarily of young people from Estonian Russians continues in both attitudes as well as in actual behaviour. The past three years have seen an increase in the proportion of Estonian respondents who consider the lifestyle and way of thinking of Estonian Russians to be different from their own and who are irritated by their lack of knowledge of the Estonian language as well as the differences in their behaviour and lifestyle.

One danger signal in the sphere of integration is the fact that in the time period of 1997-2005, the average level of knowledge of Estonian among Estonian Russians remains unchanged. At the same time, the knowledge of Estonian among people with

Estonian citizenship is very good in comparison with stateless people or those with Russian citizenship. The knowledge of Estonian of Estonian Russians also differs widely depending on where they live. In Narva, 62% of all Russians living there are unilingual (who are incapable of communicating at all in Estonian), while only 16% are unilingual in Tallinn.

At the same time, we should not overemphasise the importance of these negative facts. In interpreting the results of the monitoring study, it must be considered that integration is by nature a conflicting process because it simultaneously contains requirements for enlarging the cohesiveness of society as a whole and the preservation of the cultural differences of minorities. The coexistence of processes pulling in opposite directions inevitably leads to disagreements and even conflicts. Overcoming these disagreements and conflicts is a long-term process that requires the efforts of all parties.

Raivo Vetik

Head of the Research Group

The Social-Economic Condition of Estonians and Estonian Russians: Expectations and Changes

Marje Pavelson

The objective of social-economic integration is equal opportunity for the groups undergoing integration. How these opportunities are realised depends on the strategies that people apply in their changing environment. The changes that have taken place in the social-economic condition of Estonians and Estonian Russians are examined within the framework of this monitoring study: the behaviour of the labour market, coping, the structure of incomes and appraisals of satisfaction with one's employment and economic condition. These indicators express both opportunities and the level of their use, choices and limitations, the finding of one's place (economic positioning) in society and in the system of social-economic relations.

1. Employment and Employability

Equal opportunity can be achieved through the availability of jobs and freedom of choice. Employability depends on the willingness of people to accept recommended jobs. The most general factor in the availability of jobs is the supply of jobs, which differs from region to region in Estonia. The supply of jobs in and of itself does not ensure equal opportunity for employees with different competencies, skills and experiences. Estonians have thus far been in a better situation than Estonian Russians in the segmented job market of Estonia. The reason is differing employability, which is influenced by the unequal social capital of ethnic groups.

As a background system, the level of adaptation to the market economy, a different attitude towards work, previous practical experience in the field of employment and occupational competencies have influenced the formation of employability. Middle-aged employees with primarily industrial work experience have relatively fewer opportunities to move into other spheres of activity after changes in the economic structure and ownership relations. The reduction in employment opportunities in industry makes retraining and employment in different fields of activity necessary for them.

At the same time, employment opportunities differ in Estonia, above all in regional terms. Reasons that differ from region to region cause unemployment among Estonian Russians. Competition for jobs is more intense in Tallinn, where ever more young Estonians and Estonian Russians are converging from the periphery, and individual employability depends primarily on the education, knowledge of Estonian and job related experience of the potential employee and how well they are informed of job opportunities. If the employment rate of Estonian Russians remains lower in comparison to Estonians even in conditions of sufficient availability of work and every tenth person of working age who needs a job cannot find one (ESA 2005), the reasons should be sought either in the insufficient resources of the employee

competing with others or in the preference of nationality on the part of employers in selecting employees.

Eastern Viru County is the region with the greatest amount of industry in Estonia. Here employment opportunities are insufficient for the inhabitants of the city primarily due to the lack of available jobs or their limited availability. While the amount of industry there, which is twice as high as the average for Estonia, consistently keeps the industrial indicators of Estonian Russians high among the mostly Russian inhabitants of its cities, there is reason to speak not so much of subjective factors including the significantly lower level of knowledge of Estonian, but rather primarily about the weakness of regional economic policy and the labour market policy associated with it. The knowledge of Estonian and growing educational aspirations in Eastern Viru County in present day conditions foster the departure to the capital or heading outside of Estonia for better career opportunities of only the more capable and employable contingent of young people.

Therefore Russians living in Eastern Viru County turn out to be unemployed, or differ from other compatriots by their low employability not as a result of linguistic or nationalities policy, but rather of ineffective labour policy (Pavelson 2004).

The relatively better adaptation of Russians living in other regions of Estonia with the local environment is differentiated as a positive manifestation, as indicated by their catching up with Russians employed in Tallinn in terms of the primary social-economic indicators: this refers to Russians living in Tartu, Pärnu and Valga.

We can notice on the basis of survey data that the employment structures of Estonians and Estonian Russians are becoming similar to each other. The proportion of people employed in industry remains larger than in the Estonian group, however the occupational structure has changed. Even as recently as the year 2000, a significant portion of Estonian Russians (especially young people) was employed as unskilled labourers and assistants and for this reason in particular, their incomes and job satisfaction indicators proved to be low. Nowadays, more young Russian workers living in Estonia are skilled labourers and depending on the speed of acquisition of higher education in recent years, the proportion of specialists in the occupational structure of employed Estonian Russians is growing. Consequently, (higher) education is becoming an important factor in employability like it has been characteristic of Estonians for years already.

Previous monitoring studies referred to the circumstance that it was relatively more difficult to enter the labour market for those young Estonian Russians who were unsuccessful in competing for jobs with Estonians. They had to simultaneously also compete for those jobs that were held by representatives of the older generation of their compatriots: namely, those who had remained in their positions after the economic and social changes that took place in Estonia worked in relatively better jobs (Pavelson 2002).

Comparing individual incomes in 2002, Russians over the age of 40 living in Estonia who retained their former jobs caught up to Estonians in 2005. While young Estonians mostly under 30 worked in relatively better (new) jobs in early 2000, non-Estonians over 40 worked at better jobs. Nowadays 30-39 year old Estonians are

better positioned in the labour market. The condition of the youngest group of employees, though, is becoming equalised with Estonian Russians. Due to their education, younger Russians can be expected to provide competition for older groups of Estonian Russians. There is a different tendency in the case of Estonians: older groups are relatively more educated compared to those up to 30 years old and repercussions in incomes take place rather in the pre-pension group. Top-level specialist positions are also filled more by older groups.

In comparing the occupational structures of young Estonians to those of young Estonian Russians, the latter are occupying more and more jobs as skilled labourers and specialists (21% of Estonians up to 30 years old are employed as specialists, while the corresponding percentage of Estonian Russians in these positions is 19%), and the proportion of skilled labourers among young Estonian Russians surpasses that of all older groups. This is a new trend that attests to a change in generations in Russian skilled labourers living in Estonia.

While in terms of occupations, industry is the former preference of Estonian Russians, they are finding ever more employment in construction and transportation. While Estonians thus far outstrip non-Estonians in the service industry and commerce, the movement of the latter into the real estate business and banking is noticeable, which previously almost never occurred. At the same time, service personnel and sales clerks are more frequently middle aged Russian women, whereas these jobs are not particularly popular. The preferences of young people, rather, correspond to those of Estonians – they are interested in obtaining specialist jobs and in finding work in the public sector, where Estonians have thus far been clearly over-represented.

2. Employment Satisfaction

Although what has been written above was mostly about positive trends in the stabilising labour market, we cannot speak of the achievement of integration objectives in the sphere of labour as a whole. In comparing job satisfaction indicators of Estonian Russians with those of Estonians, the continuing lag in their job appraisals becomes apparent (see Figure 1). Although the job satisfaction of non-Estonians in 2005 has improved somewhat compared to previous years, it still lags considerably behind that of Estonians. In 2000, average job satisfaction was 3 times lower than that of Estonians. Presently it is two times lower.




Figure 1: Job satisfaction according to nationalities 2000-2005 (calculated on the scale: 1 very satisfied to -1 not at all satisfied)

The job satisfaction of Estonian Russians is lower than that of Estonians in all occupational groups, particularly in the service personnel group where there are 2.5 times more dissatisfied people than among Estonians in the same occupation.

What organisations are they employed in? While nowadays there are relatively speaking more Estonians working as unskilled labourers and they are characterised by a large number of dissatisfied individuals (45% of Estonians are not satisfied with their jobs), the dissatisfaction of Estonian Russians turns out to be even greater (65% dissatisfied). While the job satisfaction of skilled labourers was significantly higher in 2002 due in particular to Estonian Russians, the present decline significantly influences the level of satisfaction of workers in general, which is nevertheless lower than that of other groups due to the attitude of unqualified labourers.

The previous monitoring study already called attention to the difference in the levels of job satisfaction among service personnel (primarily women) in terms of ethnic groups. By now dissatisfaction with work in the service industry among Estonian Russians has increased even further, thus increasing the difference between the job satisfaction of men and women. While the job satisfaction indicators of Estonian men and women practically do not differ at all, Russian women living in Estonia are considerably less satisfied with their jobs than Estonian women and non-Estonian men. Consequently it is not only who one works as that is important, but rather both the sphere of activity and the type of organisation where one is employed prove to be

important. The decline in the job satisfaction of Estonians on the background of the minimal rise in satisfaction of Estonian Russians actualises the issue of the relationship between the employer and the employee that appears to have influenced the decline in job appraisals. The problem is also important because there are no essential differences in job satisfaction between regions, yet there are differences between spheres of activity and occupations. It is noticeable in Tallinn that the proportion of those who are very satisfied is greater in comparison to other regions (one fifth of employed Estonians).

Differences are noticeable between various spheres of activity in the job satisfaction of both Estonians and Estonian Russians. In both groups under consideration, the greatest number of dissatisfied individuals are in agriculture, where the low appraisal of Estonian Russians cannot be considered statistically valid due to their small number employed in this field. The lowest job satisfaction is characteristic of those employed in construction. Estonian Russians are less satisfied compared to Estonians in the service and commerce industries and in industry. Appraisals by Russians are lower in comparison to those of Estonians when considering each sphere of activity separately (see Table 1).

Table 1: Proportion of People Dissatisfied with their Jobs by Sphere of Activity (%)

Sphere of activity	Estonians	Estonian Russians
- agriculture/fishing	38	...
- industry	23	39
- construction	35	46
- transportation,	12	26
communication	-	8
- banking, real estate	28	40
- service/commerce	15	21
- education, research	16	25
- public administration		
Total	22	35

Job satisfaction improves in association with an increase in the level of education. Workers with basic elementary education who are employed in agriculture, construction or workers' jobs in industry are least satisfied. Education and job satisfaction are more connected to each other in the case of Estonians.

Young people (under the age of 30) are less satisfied with their jobs in both groups under consideration: at the same time, dissatisfaction increases in association with movement into white-collar occupations. Differences in job satisfaction are particularly great among young Estonian Russians: while nearly 2/3 of Estonian unskilled labourers are satisfied with their jobs, only one quarter of Estonian Russians are satisfied. Also only half of skilled labourers, who dominate among young Estonian Russians, are satisfied. Over half of service personnel and sales clerks are dissatisfied. The proportion of dissatisfied individuals is minimal amongst specialists (14% of young Estonians and 13% of non-Estonians are not satisfied with their jobs). Young non-Estonian managers are absolutely satisfied with their jobs. Their proportion in both random samples of young people, however, is insufficient for the results to be statistically valid. It can, however, be stated that neither group of young people is particularly interested in being a worker. Work in the service industry also

does not offer satisfaction to Estonian Russians. A rise in status beginning with office employee increases job satisfaction and evens out job appraisals of young people. Consequently, the occupation of worker or ordinary service employee offers little appeal to young Estonian Russians as well. The status of white-collar worker is an objective for them in the name of which they acquire higher education and on which they build their hopes for the future.

Analysis of job satisfaction and the labour market situation indicates that alongside structures of spheres of activity and occupational structures, job satisfaction has not significantly improved. The job satisfaction of Estonians has even decreased. An increase in job satisfaction is indeed noticeable among Estonian Russians, but this is on account of the fact that they have achieved a certain degree of success in competing for jobs as specialists and managers and this has been achieved over the past decade through higher education acquired in Estonia. Young Estonian Russians do not settle for jobs as workers although their employment as skilled labourers has replaced the previous forced employment as unskilled labourers or in the other segment of the labour market with less desirable jobs.

It can be presumed that the noticeable improvement in knowledge of Estonian among young people is associated with the aspirations of Estonian Russians for (higher) education in the event that they are oriented to continuing their education in Estonia. The stampede to Tallinn has become characteristic of Russian young people from Eastern Viru County and elsewhere, as has been typical of Estonian young people for quite some time already.

It can be presumed that those who plan to continue their education outside of Estonia in the future also do not consider it necessary to learn the official language since they hope to work in Europe in the future. The good mastery of the language exhibited by young Estonian Russians employed as specialists (over 80% of them claim to be fluent or very fluent in Estonian) confirms that Estonian higher education is effective in terms of knowledge of the Estonian language. Consequently, local educational opportunities are of primary importance from the perspective of both the integration of Estonian Russians and the future, which also confirms the results of earlier research (Pavelson 2002).

3. Coping and Incomes

Making ends meet is treated in all monitoring studies through the possibilities for living on the incomes available. The economic condition of various social groups has also been evaluated in the same way in various studies in the late 1990's. The greater relative poverty of Estonian Russians compared to Estonians has become apparent in all previous studies. What stood out about the 1990's was first and foremost the large number of very poor people in both groups, whereas their relative proportion extended over one quarter particularly among Estonian Russians prior to the year 2000. As late as 1999, when the unemployment rate of this group was ever increasing, the relative proportion of extreme poverty (who had difficulty even in covering expenses for food) was 29% in the group of 40-year-old Estonian Russians. The first monitoring of integration revealed the extreme poverty of over one tenth of Estonian Russians. In addition, over half of them also had difficulty in covering other expenses: in total, nearly 2/3 of Estonian Russians could be considered poor. The

number of families in the Estonian group that were barely making ends meet formed over half of those surveyed.

Data from 2002 confirmed the equalisation of the relative proportion of the extremely impoverished in the Estonian and Russian groups, although the proportion of Estonians who were better coping had grown. The data of this survey indicated a considerably larger stratification among Estonians and a numerical increase in Estonians who were well off: their relative proportion grew to one fifth and the number of poor declined somewhat along with the stability of extreme poverty. The proportion of families with difficulties in making ends meet among Estonian Russians still formed over half of all families and well-off families still were less than one fifth.

The data from the latest survey indicates that a significant decline in the proportion of the very poor has taken place in both groups and the relative proportion of people among Estonian Russians who cannot purchase expensive durable goods, yet are capable of saving up money, grew significantly compared to Estonians. The decrease in extreme poverty and the growth in the relative proportion of families with opportunities to save up money are the more important changes that characterise how Estonian Russians are able to cope over the past couple of years. The proportion of well-off families has also equalised in both groups, remaining in the vicinity of one fifth, which confirms continuing stratification among Estonian Russians as well.

In this connection, the considerable decrease in the relative proportion of Estonian Russians with difficulty in coping in comparison with Estonians, among whom the proportion of families with difficulty in making ends meet has decreased somewhat more slowly than in the group of Estonian Russians, is important (see Table 2).

Table 2: Changes in Making Ends Meet During the Years 2000-2005 (%)

Level of making ends meet	Estonians			Estonian Russians		
	2000	2002	2005	2000	2002	2005
Extremely poor (not enough money for food)	8	9	5	11	9	4
Poor (not enough money for clothing)	49	38	36	52	47	32
Savers with low purchasing power	28	29	37	26	42	48
Consumers with purchasing power	15	22	21	11	18	22

This tendency refers again in particular to the inhibition of the increase in economic success of some Estonians and their difficulties in advancing their own economic capital.

All of these changes converge the structures of coping of the different groups of nationalities. Measuring the level of coping on the scale -2 (extreme poverty) to 2 (the ability to purchase everything one wants), we see both groups approaching an intermediate level where the purchase of expensive goods is still difficult, yet opportunities for saving up money for purchasing such goods in the future already exist (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Changes in making ends meet among Estonians and Estonian Russians in the years 2000-2005 (calculated on the scale: +2 ability to buy everything we want, extending to -2 not enough money even to buy food)

The level of coping differs from region to region and is influenced by the employment rate, age and citizenship. Extreme poverty among Estonian Russians is more typical for the unemployed, somewhat more characteristic for older groups, widespread in Eastern Viru County and in Tallinn as well, compared to Estonians. Regional differences are strong between Tallinn and the rest of Estonia, where there are more poor people in general, in the case of Estonians. For Estonians, extreme poverty is a problem in the cities rather than in rural areas, where people manage with food expenses. Larger cities that are strongly stratified on the basis of incomes are in a worse situation, since there is in general more poverty and extreme poverty.

The proportion of families capable of saving money has increased among Russians living in Eastern Viru County, attaining a level comparable to that of Russians in Tallinn. At the same time, however, the proportion of extreme poverty is above average in both Tallinn and Eastern Viru County. There are half as many Russians in Eastern Viru County capable of purchasing what they want as in other regions, including Tallinn.

Compared to Estonians, the difficulties of Russians living in Tallinn in coping are also larger: while the proportion of extremely poor Estonians in the capital is minimal and 27% of Tallinn's Estonians are able to purchase practically everything, the Russians of the capital are more like consumers who are more often capable of saving up money, but not yet of purchasing more expensive goods. It can be concluded that in Tallinn in particular, Estonians cope better than Russians living in Tallinn, who are even more stratified in the capital than their Estonian fellow townspeople.

Compared to Estonian young people, Russian young people claim to better cope. The reason may lie in that the greater portion of the latter are students who live within their family with their parents and do not earn money themselves. They overestimate the possibilities of their family to some extent. Estonian young people, who more frequently live on their own, base their appraisal of their level of making ends meet on their own possibilities.

The fact that more well-off Estonians are concentrated in Tallinn becomes apparent from the analysis of incomes. The economic situation of non-Estonians proves to be more homogeneous in other regions but not in Tallinn, where differences are large. Since Eastern Viru County is very poor, Russians living in the cities in other counties coping more successfully. At the same time, the difficulties of Estonians in coping in particular are noticeable in other cities, where the proportion of very poor people is greater and the purchasing power of families is considerably smaller than in the capital. On the other hand, there is less extreme poverty in rural areas than in cities, although the proportion of poor people is considerable, especially compared to the capital.

If we compare the incomes of Estonians and Estonian Russians on the basis of money that can be disposed of individually (personal net income) and income earned per family member, it can indeed be concluded that economic conditions are becoming more similar, if not equal.

Table 3: Personal Net Income of Estonians and Estonian Russians by Income Group (%)

Income group	Estonians	Estonian Russians
Low (up to 2500 kroons)	37	42
Intermediate (up to 500 kroons)	37	37
Higher (over 5000 kroons)	16	11
No income	10	10

According to the data in Table 3, the incomes of Estonian Russians continue to lag behind those of Estonians, differing more than the corresponding indicators for making ends meet. At the same time, the differences were not as drastic as they had previously been in comparison to data from previous surveys. The groups under consideration are distributed even more evenly in terms of incomes per family member.

Table 4: Incomes of Estonians and Estonian Russians Per Family Member (%)

Income in kroons	Estonians	Estonian Russians
Up to 1500	20	17
1501 to 2500	40	44
2501 to 4000	27	28
Over 4000	13	11

The division into income groups is similar in both groups under consideration, which again confirms the tendency towards convergence not only of coping but also of its actual basis – incomes. While all previous surveys reveal a larger relative proportion of more well to do people among Estonians, in the present case there is certainly no basis for this.

Regional difference is a separate problem that is represented most clearly by Eastern Viru County (see Table 5) and, in comparison with Estonians, also Tallinn.

Table 5: Regional Differences in Personal Net Incomes of Estonian Russians* (%)

Region	Low	Intermediate	Higher	No income
Tallinn	31	37	15	17
- Estonians	25	41	25	10
Eastern Viru County	58	30	7	5
Other regions	42	48	7	3

* Frequencies are calculated excluding those who refuse to submit their incomes, which differs from group to group

It can be concluded from Table 5 that the largest difference in incomes compared to Estonians is in Tallinn, where a quarter of Estonians belong to both the lowest and highest income brackets. In other words, the distribution of incomes here is normal. At the same time, Russians living in the capital are clearly poorer and their condition in Tallinn is comparable with that of Estonians elsewhere in Estonia. Also, Russians in Eastern Viru County are significantly poorer than those in Tallinn and are somewhat ahead of Estonians in other Estonian cities, where there are few well-off people and wages are lower than in Tallinn.

The type of citizenship is nearly as strong a factor in the structure of incomes. The incomes of Russians with Estonian citizenship are higher on average and are significantly higher than the incomes of both Russian citizens and stateless individuals (see Table 6).

Table 6: Structure of Personal Net Income of Estonian Russians with Different Citizenship Status (%)

Type of Citizenship	Low (up to 2500 kroons)	Intermediate (2500 – 5000 kroons)	Higher (over 5000 kroons)	No income
Estonian citizen	31	42	16	11
Russian citizen	55	33	9	3
Stateless	46	35	4	14

Since Russians with Estonian citizenship are frequently younger and more educated, this kind of income structure fits to expectations. Since it is not easy to find a good job in Estonia without knowing Estonian, this situation can be considered logical.

The convergence of incomes in the groups under consideration also influences the consumption behaviour. The use of residential loans and leasing is more widespread in younger employable groups, but the belief that only Estonians take out loans is incorrect. Loans are taken out upwards of a net income of 5000 regardless of nationality. Thus there are 7-8% of people who have taken out residential loans, 7% of those who lease (automobiles), and a quarter of those who make purchases using instalment plans in both groups under consideration. Non-Estonians who have taken out residential loans more frequently have Estonian citizenship. They are young and mostly have higher education. The range of Estonians who have taken out loans is considerably broader according to demographic indicators but as a rule, those who

take out loans have at least an average level of material security. Thus the data does not support the notion that opportunities and the courage to take out loans is characteristic of Estonians alone. Estonians, however, complain more about difficulties in paying back their loans than do Estonian Russians. The only difference between the groups is in the practice of taking out small loans, where Estonian Russians are more active compared to Estonians. The proportion associated with educational loans is similar: every tenth person in both groups services an educational loan.

It can be concluded that the trend towards equalisation of incomes directly influences consumption behaviour and that those in better positions in the labour market are equally active as consumers as well, although the overall low relative proportions of people taking out loans indicate a scarcity of opportunities for purchasing expensive goods.

4. Strategies for coping

Thrift and subjective strategies to ensure coping more effectively were examined as a separate issue.

The primary factor in coping is the existence of a job. Joining the labour market and employment are the most decisive activities fostering coping. Here Estonians are clearly ahead of Estonian Russians: over the past 2 years, 44% of Estonians and 36% of Estonian Russians have joined the workforce, among those 49% of young Estonians (up to 29 years of age) and one third of Estonian Russians. This kind of distribution confirms the continuing difficulties of young Estonian Russians in finding work and the particularly inadequate employment opportunities for less educated young people (including those with secondary education). More Russians over 30 years old living in Estonia have found work. Young people with relatively better levels of education have not kept up with them. The procurement of incidental earnings, which almost twice as many Estonians than Estonian Russians have engaged in the interests of coping (36% of Estonians and 19% of Estonian Russians), also confirms the same. Those seeking better means for coping by changing jobs are considerably more similar: 17% of Estonians and 13% of Estonian Russians have gotten better jobs. The fact that only one sixth of all those surveyed have moved on to better jobs in recent years demonstrates a reduction in (vertical) work related mobility, which was customary especially for (young) Estonians in the late 1990's. It can be surmised that changing jobs and rapidly developing careers are being replaced by more stable behaviour of the labour market, which is also characteristic of contemporary young people since competition for better jobs has increased, particularly in Tallinn.

Some differences are also noticeable in the sphere of work-related training and self-development. Less than one third of all respondents surveyed have learned something additional in the interests of work, whereas Estonians have done so more frequently (29%) than Estonian Russians (21%), among whom young people have been most active. At the same time, Estonian Russians have been active in language study: a quarter of them have purposely studied languages (including Estonian). Considerably fewer young Estonians are students or work-related students. Thus only 19% of young Estonians have studied language separately (47% of young Russians), and 38%

have improved their level of education (in schools, universities) (46% of Estonian Russians).

There are other possibilities for better coping. One of them is changing one's place of residence. Every tenth Estonian has moved somewhere else (to the city, to the country) over the course of the past couple of years, whereas Estonian Russians are conspicuously less mobile (3% have changed their place of residence). It is not particularly popular to move to a cheaper place of residence in the name of better coping, especially among Estonian Russians, as there are fewer among them who have worked outside of Estonia. This is conspicuous in the case of young people: 8% of young Estonians have worked abroad, while only a few Estonian Russians have done so (3%). There are also fewer people who have started businesses or are oriented to that line of work among Russians than there are among Estonians. Especially young people in both groups under consideration are extremely reserved in this respect. At the same time, the economic position of entrepreneurs compared to wage earners is significantly better. No particular hindrances are perceived for this activity in either of the groups under consideration.

Estonians, especially young people, appear to be somewhat thriftier compared to Russians of the same age. Thrift as a factor in coping is more characteristic of pension age Estonian Russians; young people on the contrary do not appreciate this. The purchase of used clothing, for example, is also more characteristic of Estonians, including young people. The Russian customer living in Estonia uses this possibility less, and young people do so especially rarely.

It can be concluded that there are no major differences in consumption behaviour and ensuring coping, yet there are such differences in the behaviour of the labour market (see Table 7), the background for which is the relative limitedness of job opportunities thus far for Estonian Russians and individual problems associated with employability.

Table 7: Ways of Improving Making Ends Meet (%)

Way of Improving Making Ends Meet	Estonians	Estonian Russians	Estonian Young People	Russian Young People living in Estonia
WORK				
- gained employment	44	36	49	33
- got a better job	17	13	20	16
- sought incidental earnings	36	19	36	17
- worked abroad	5	3	8	3
- started a business	5	3	4	3
STUDY				
- work-related training	29	21	30	28
- raised level of education	16	15	38	46
- purposely studied languages	12	25	19	47
PLACE OF RESIDENCE				
- changed place of residence	10	3	18	2
- moved to a cheaper abode	7	4	9	2
THRIFT				
- started to live more thriftily				
- bought used clothing	51	47	44	33

5. Satisfaction with the Economic Situation: Expectations and Their Fulfilment

The stability of the rate of employment and the very modest numerical increase in residents of Estonia with jobs (the number of employed people increased by 2000 over the course of the year), the decrease in unemployment, yet primarily among Estonians, continuing unemployment among young people and the increase in the relative proportion of long-term unemployed in the group of the youngest people of working age are signs that refer to continuing problems that accompany the trend toward stabilisation of the labour market for those Estonian Russians with less social resources.

For Estonians, many of the factors named that decrease employability are the same: young people with secondary level education have no perspectives on the labour market, positioning oneself is complicated for those who have moved from the country to the city, and certainly not everyone knows how to be capable of working in changing conditions. Many jobs, however, no longer offer quick success nor do they make it possible for everyone to realise their own inflated expectations. Success is appreciated in Estonia and Estonian Russians, whose individual ability to compete and employability have thus far been lower than those of Estonians, also do so ever more. Nevertheless, lifestyles gradually converge, patterns of consumption are becoming more similar and competition is becoming more intense through (higher) education.

If we compare appraisals of the economic condition through three monitoring studies (Figure 3), the lag of average appraisals is noticeable in 2005 compared to the appraisals of 2000 in both groups. Calculated on a scale of 1 (very good) to -1 (very bad), satisfaction indexes remain below 0, whereas the average appraisal of Estonian Russians has improved markedly compared to 2002 in comparison with the stable dissatisfaction of Estonians.




Figure 3: Appraisals of the economic situation in the years 2000-2005 (calculated on the scale: 1 completely satisfied to -1 not at all satisfied)

It can be presumed that changes in coping are one factor in the appraisals of Estonian Russians, but the continuation of unemployment, the state of economic situation of Eastern Viru County and social differences among Russians themselves living in Estonia have prevented appraisals from reaching the level of 2000, where the criteria of appraisal were different. Struggling out of poverty, adaptation and establishing oneself on the labour market, which was indeed hoped for but was not achieved, created a significant decline in appraisals as well, the result of which was the intensification of extreme poverty and of the scarcity of opportunities. The appraisal of the economic situation does not depend directly on incomes, especially at the lower end of their scale, or on the possibility of eating, procuring clothing or having a roof over one's head. Rather, how one feels in society, to what extent expectations concerning its developments are fixed, and the stability and acceptability of the environment where one lives are important. The collective consciousness of Estonian Russians must also be accounted for, as this is not based solely on one's own condition but rather also on the opportunities of significant others (often compatriots) and their realisation.

Table 8: Appraisals of the Economic Situation in Groups Under Consideration (%)

Groups	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Estonians	38	61
Estonian Russians	31	67
Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship	45	54
Young Estonians	44	53
Young Estonian Russians	36	61
Young Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship	48	48

According to the data of Table 8, the appraisals of Estonians and Estonian Russians are similar. The relative proportions of satisfied individuals overlap especially in the groups of young people, whereas young people with Estonian citizenship are the most satisfied with the economic situation and Russians with Estonian citizenship in total are on the same level as Estonian young people. Although the older generations in both groups are more often dissatisfied and 2/3 of all those surveyed do not have a particularly high opinion of their material security, this can be considered entirely in accordance with expectations: the average resident of Estonia cannot consider himself economically secure by any means. Rather, he has reached the level where he manages to satisfy his primary needs well enough but not more. Consequently there is no reason for any particular sense of satisfaction. Eastern Viru County again stands out in particular, where 79% are dissatisfied with their economic situation and where the greatest amount of complaining originates concerning the worsening of the situation.

Estonians see the positive changes in the economic situation over the course of the last couple of years more clearly than Estonian Russians. Nevertheless, the appraisals of Estonians concerning changes are also relatively stable throughout different monitoring studies. Thus 35% of Estonians and 19% of Estonian Russians claim that

their situation has improved. At the same time, the proportion of those families whose economic situation has worsened has decreased significantly: while they comprised one-third in both groups in 2002, nowadays they comprise 17% of Estonians and 28% of non-Estonians. The last 5 years have significantly decreased that portion of society whose situation is worsening, and increased the relative proportion of those who see their condition as stable. This is particularly conspicuous in the group of Estonian Russians, where over half see their situation as unchanged (Table 9).

Table 9: Appraisal of Change in the Economic Situation in the Years 2000-2005 (%)

Groups		Economic situation has:		
		Improved	Remained the same	Worsened
Estonians	2000	28	22	44
	2002	38	30	30
	2005	35	46	17
Estonian 2000	Russians	28	17	48
		23	38	37
	2002	19	52	28
	2005			

Appraisals of the economic situation correlate to job satisfaction: the reduction in unemployment is one of the more essential factors in appraising changes. Yet it is not the only one: the stabilisation of the labour market and the increase in wages, improvement in the organisation of work and in organisational culture, the broadening of opportunities for employment – all these factors come into consideration. For example, 14% in Eastern Viru County see improvement in the economic situation of their family, while 39% see worsening. The situation among Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship has improved for one third of them, in other words at almost the same rate compared to Estonians (entirely 48% of young people).

The older the evaluator, the less he notices the positive changes in the economic situation. For example, only 7% of Russians over 55 years of age living in Estonia indicate improvement in their family's situation. This tendency is characteristic of both groups under consideration and analogous attitudes are transferred to the appraisal of future economic perspectives as well. A total of 41% of Russian young people and 60% of Estonian young people hope that the economic situation of their families will more or less improve in 5 years time. Young people in Tallinn are especially optimistic. Here half of the Russians living there hope for positive developments. At the same time, older groups of Estonian Russians are considerably more pessimistic in their hopes: while 42% of Estonians are hopeful concerning the future, 32% of Estonian Russians feel the same way, whereas residents of Tallinn and small towns are more optimistic among Estonians. The more optimistic Estonian Russians are those who live outside Eastern Viru County or Tallinn, where they have succeeded in finding work and positioning themselves economically in the same way and to the same extent as compared to Estonians.

6. Economic Positioning

In order to explain the social-economic condition of Estonians and Russians living in contemporary Estonia, we tried to find an indicator that would measure the realisation of economic opportunities. Incomes, the level of coping, or salary level are not suitable for this purpose since they depend on the employment structure and place of residence (which also functions for both incomes and opportunities for coping). An indicator was constructed that is founded on subjective appraisals: job satisfaction, the appraisal of change in economic condition, and the possibility of finding an acceptable job if necessary in the same region where one lives were all measured.

While the first two aspects to be measured (job satisfaction and change in economic condition) were considered above, then here the opportunity to find a job (according to one's own self-appraisal) deserves an explanation. According to the monitoring study of 2000, half of the Estonians and 30% of the Estonian Russians surveyed claimed that if necessary, they could find a new job in the near vicinity. In 2005, half of both groups held the same opinion. Have the opportunities for Estonians remained the same and those for Russians grown?

Changing jobs has slowed down for the present and advantageous jobs are retained by both groups under consideration, whereas those over 40 years of age do so especially painstakingly. Half of both groups have remained at the same job for the last two years, 15% have changed jobs once, and 30% have not worked at all.

The frequency of changing jobs is exactly the same in both groups. The only difference is that Estonian Russians who work at better jobs are older than Estonians with the same kinds of jobs, of whom the most successful contingent belongs to the age group over 30 years of age. This means that entering the labour market and getting jobs in the premium segment of the labour market is becoming more difficult for young Estonians, since there are abundant employees with higher education among Estonians over 40 years of age.

High unemployment among young people is difficult to overcome for this reason and deserves continuous government attention. The fact that 47% of both nationality groups consider it possible to find acceptable jobs in the area where they live (57% of young Estonians and 62% of young Estonian Russians) is undoubtedly a step forward. Although Estonians are more mobile, working more often outside of the area where they live (17% compared to 10% of Russians) and being satisfied with this arrangement, it can be considered logical that Estonians are more prepared to find jobs elsewhere in Estonia. At the same time, (especially young) Estonian Russians are in a more favourable position according to their opinion of themselves for presumably finding work abroad. There is, however, a certain difference between the evaluators of these possibilities: while more educated Estonians in particular are more or less certain of finding acceptable work abroad, the less educated portion of young Estonian Russians are of the same opinion. Since many of these hopes can prove to be unattainable, we limited ourselves in our construct, which we treat as economic positioning, to an appraisal of job opportunities in the near vicinity (acceptable work in the area where one lives).

The construct that combines the above-mentioned 3 appraisals measures positioning as a combination of job satisfaction (completely or mostly satisfied), economic change (the situation has improved over the past 2 years or remained the same) and

job opportunities (certain or very likely to find acceptable work in the area where one lives). We conditionally refer to the indicator containing these positive appraisals as economic positioning (EP), which is measured by the frequency with which these attributes occur simultaneously (% of the group under observation).

The relative proportion of EP is higher in Estonians: 29% of Estonians have it (23% of Estonian Russians), 47% and 37% respectively of the employed individuals in the groups under consideration. Positioning increases with improving status: entrepreneurs (owners) have more opportunities than wage earners. Unskilled labourers have the lowest EP (15%) among Estonian Russians and managers of establishments or sub-units have the highest EP (67%). The same trend of increasing EP is also characteristic of Estonians, although the EP index of Estonian unskilled labourers is somewhat higher than that of non-Estonians.

In the groups of young people, the EP in the group of Estonian Russians varies from 23% (unskilled labourers) to 82% (specialists), while in the case of Estonians it varies from 45% also to 82% (specialists). Employed young people have positioned themselves significantly more compared to other older groups (52% of Estonians, 46% of Russians). If we, however, compare age groups, the positioning of young people is weaker than that of those over 30 years of age, although their positioning considerably exceeds that of those nearing their pensions. The group between the ages of 30-39 has the largest relative proportion of EP among Estonians. The successful people among Estonian Russians, on the other hand, belong to the 40-49 age group. These groups are namely the competitors that today's young people have to contend with.

The strongest factor in positioning is education. This applies in particular to young Estonian Russians. While the EP is only 4% for Russians under 30 years of age living in Estonia with basic elementary education, the EP extends to 80% in the case of those with higher education. The variability of the EP of Estonians is smaller, but among those with higher education, the proportion of EP extends significantly higher in this group as well. In the case of this entire generation, the EP varies less in terms of education, yet in terms of its effect, education also remains the factor that most strongly influences EP.

Table 10: EP of Groups with Different Levels of Education (%)

Education	Estonians	Estonian Russians
Basic elementary education	16	6
Secondary education	28	25
Higher education	54	42

The positioned Estonian operates in the capital (the EP forms 40%). For Estonian Russians, it is not Tallinn, where the competition is intense and is growing even more intense, that offers a higher EP, but rather other cities (in the counties). The EP is low in Eastern Viru County and the departure of educated young Russians from that region of Estonia to the capital (or abroad) will influence the social and economic potential of the cities in the region in the future, the trend of which has already been in decline. The EP group of the Russians of Eastern Viru County forms 13%, in other words it is the lowest of all, also remaining below that of the Estonians of the region.

The EP of Russians living in Tallinn is 23%, thus it is at an average level. In other regions, though, it is 39%, in other words significantly higher than in Tallinn.

The EP is an essential factor in incomes, coping and consumption behaviour. As can be expected, the EP of Russian citizens of Estonia is larger: 39%, or higher than for Estonians, and economic positioning proves to be lowest for Russian citizens (7%). One important conclusion derives from this. While Table 10 above indicates the lower positioning of Estonian Russians with higher education compared to Estonians with the same level of education, this difference does not exist in the case of young people: Estonians and Russians with higher education position themselves through their work at an entirely equal rate. Differences emerge only in the case of lower levels of education, since Estonians have thus far succeeded in establishing themselves to a greater extent even with incomplete education. At the same time, the increase in the relative proportion of Estonians with basic elementary education and the change in the occupational structure of young people confirms that the opportunity for finding jobs better than those of unskilled labourers with a poor education is ever shrinking. On the other hand, the number of those Estonian Russians with *new* higher education is increasing and they are competing for better jobs. Consequently the *price* of higher education on the labour market is increasing for Estonian Russians depending on how and where that education has been acquired.

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Language Proficiency of Estonian Russians and Their Attitude Toward Gymnasium Reform of 2007

Ivi Proos

1. Proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians Remains Stable

In analysing the integration process taking place in Estonia, issues associated with language proficiency are always at the centre of attention. Knowledge of Estonian among the Russian speaking population has had at least two essential meanings. **First**, the political aspect. Knowledge of the Estonian language makes it possible to pass the language examination, which in turn makes it possible to apply for Estonian citizenship if the applicant for citizenship has in addition to the language exam also passed a second exam concerning knowledge of the constitution. **Secondly**, knowledge of the Estonian language has an important pragmatic meaning for Estonian Russians. The fluent mastery of the official language is an additional value for every Russian living in Estonia for success in Estonia. Language proficiency increases their ability to compete on the labour market, increases freedom of choice in finding educational opportunities in Estonia, and the fluent mastery of the official language definitely gives Estonian Russians an added feeling of security and self-confidence.

In all surveys that we have conducted in cooperation with the Integration Foundation (IF), we have used a methodology for determining proficiency in Estonian in which respondents themselves evaluated their knowledge of the Estonian language from four different positions: 1) understanding verbal speech, 2) reading proficiency, 3) writing proficiency, and 4) ability to converse. Thus in analysing language proficiency of Estonian Russians, we have used people's evaluations of their own knowledge of the Estonian language as a basis. The table (Appendix 1) presented at the end of this article provides data concerning proficiency in Estonian in all four positions during the period from 1997 to 2005.

The **citizenship indicator** is best suited for differentiating the language proficiency of Estonian Russians and for pointing out differences. The level of language proficiency of Estonian Russians varies greatly depending on citizenship. This time we used responses to the question "*Capability of conversing in Estonian*" to analyse in depth problems associated with language proficiency. Capability of conversing best demonstrates active language proficiency, in other words the kind of language proficiency that starts to influence the choices people are faced with when a young person plans his opportunities for education or when in the process of getting a job it is necessary to appear before the prospective employer for a conversation to determine what level the applicant is at.

Based on the self-evaluations of people concerning their capability of conversing in Estonian, we have divided Estonian Russians into three different groups:

1. Group with active language proficiency (capable of conversing "well" or "average")
2. Group with uncertain proficiency in conversation (converse "a little")
3. Unilingual group ("not at all capable" of conversing in Estonian)

There was an average of 42% of Estonian Russians with active language proficiency according to the study of 2005 (43% according to the study of 2002). The group with

uncertain proficiency formed 33% of adult Estonian Russians (29%) and there were 25% unilingual Estonian Russians (28%). According to the study of 2005, the language proficiency in Estonian of 59% of young (up to 29 years of age) Estonian Russians was active, the proficiency of 27% was uncertain and 14% were unilingual. The smaller relative proportion of unilingual young people in particular compared to the average indicator of the non-Estonian community is a positive development.

Citizenship Reflects Proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians

The language proficiency of Estonian Russians **with Estonian citizenship** is significantly better compared to other citizenship groups (see Figure 1). According to the study of 2005, the language proficiency of 71% of Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship was active (I converse well or average) (62% in 1997). The proficiency of 17% (23%) was uncertain and 12% (15%) were unilingual. The trend is positive. The Estonian language proficiency of Russian speakers with Estonian citizenship is continually improving.




Figure 1: Appraisals by Estonian Russians of their own proficiency in Estonian in terms of citizenship groups (%)

Generally speaking, Estonian citizenship is obtained through naturalisation, which requires passing an examination in the Estonian language. Thus theoretically speaking, all Russophones with Estonian citizenship should have mastered the Estonian language at least at the conversational level. The fact that some Estonian Russians were granted Estonian citizenship in the early 1990's without the language examination requirement influences the situation, and secondly, the trend of forgetting also certainly influences proficiency in Estonian. Russophones who live in a Russian language environment (Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe) and have at some point passed the Estonian language examination and received

Estonian citizenship, practically do not use Estonian any longer, and now appraise their language proficiency critically, thus ending up in the uncertain language proficiency group or even in the unilingual group.

The language proficiency of **young** (up to 29 years of age) Estonian Russians **with Estonian citizenship** is better than average for Russophones with Estonian citizenship. The language proficiency of 83% of young people was active in 2005, with 12% uncertain users of the language and 5% unilingual.

The proficiency in Estonian of 25% (23% in 1997) of Russian speakers **with undetermined citizenship** was active according to the survey of 2005, 49% (40%) were uncertain and 26% (37%) were unilingual. The large relative proportion of people with uncertain language proficiency is characteristic of the group of Estonian Russians with undetermined citizenship. This is a very important target group for language courses and other activities directed at training language proficiency and supplementing conversational proficiency. It is positive that the relative importance of unilingual people in the group of Estonian Russians with undetermined citizenship has decreased significantly in eight years from 37% in 1997 to 26% in 2005.

The proficiency in Estonian of 37% (including 6% with “good” language proficiency) of **young people with undetermined citizenship** was active in 2005. This is a group of young people who could potentially apply for Estonian citizenship. Their present level of language proficiency would give them a certain advantage in applying for citizenship in the future. According to their own appraisals, 79% of young people with undetermined citizenship would like to acquire Estonian citizenship (on average, 73% of Estonian Russians with undetermined citizenship would like to acquire Estonian citizenship). Thus the motive for applying for citizenship exists. How many young Estonian Russians want to make an effort in the name of Estonian citizenship and actually arrive at their goal is another question. For the sake of comparison, 12% of young Estonian Russians with undetermined citizenship want Russian citizenship and 15% want to become citizens of some other country.

Active language proficiency among non-Estonians **with Russian citizenship** is rapidly decreasing. According to data from the study of 2005, the language proficiency of 5% of Russian citizens living in Estonia was active (23% in 1997 and 16% in 2002), the relative proportion of people with uncertain proficiency in Estonian was 44% (3%) and 51% (40%) of Russian citizens were unilingual. The relative proportion of young people with Russian citizenship is small (11% of young people up to 29 years of age), and therefore sociological studies carried out using the standard random sample (about 1000 respondents) do not make it possible to analyse further this social group. Their number in the random sample is too small for this.

In summary, it can be said that the level of language proficiency of Estonian Russians (the evaluations of the respondents concerning their ability to communicate in Estonian) has been consistently stable over the past 8 years. The language proficiency of Estonian Russians with Estonian citizenship (primarily young Russians) has improved, and Russian citizens living in Estonia (primarily older people) evaluate their knowledge of Estonian ever more critically and consider it ever poorer. These two trends proceeding in parallel keep the level of language proficiency of Estonian Russians stable.

The Age Group Entering the Labour Market has Better Estonian Language Proficiency Than Others

Table 1: Evaluations by Estonian Russians of Their Language Proficiency, Their Ability to Communicate in Estonian (in 2005, %)

Age of respondents	Evaluations by Estonian Russians of their language proficiency (their ability to communicate in Estonian)		
	Active language proficiency*	Uncertain language proficiency**	Unilingual***
15 – 19	63	29	8
20 – 29	72	20	8
30 – 39	41	33	26
40 – 49	37	40	23
50 – 59	38	38	24
60 – 74	13	38	49
Average	42	33	25

* Active language proficiency = I communicate “well” or “average”

** Uncertain language proficiency = I communicate “a little”

*** Unilingual = not able to communicate at all

Estonian Russians in the 20–29 age group have the best language proficiency. This is the age group that is entering the labour market and is actively seeking opportunities for achieving job-related success. There are also people in this age group who are graduating from institutions of higher education and are actively looking for work. Those young people, who have purposely and actively studied Estonian, completed language immersion programmes and participated in the many language learning projects over the past fifteen years also belong to this age group. Results of the study indicate that funding projects for language learning have had a positive influence in relation to the 20–29 age group.

The sudden drop in active language proficiency among Estonian Russians over 30 years of age is noteworthy. It can indirectly be concluded from this that the generation of people under 30 years of age is in a significantly stronger position from the standpoint of language proficiency than 30 year old and older Estonian Russians in the inner competition within the Estonian Russian community for better jobs and educational opportunities.

Significance of Place of Residence and Linguistic Environment in the Formation of Language Proficiency

The environment where a person continually lives and works significantly influences the language proficiency of Estonian Russians. There are essential differences between different regions. Three regional dimensions are suitable for comparison in order to illustrate the problem: **Tallinn, Narva and other county centres**. We worked with a random sample of 1000 people in analysing the data from the survey of 2005 (see explanations concerning the random sample of the study in the introduction). For this reason in the analysis of the Russian speaking community, Tallinn and Narva in particular are the kinds of cities where the numbers of respondents are large enough to facilitate analysis of those regions as independent social groups. There were 150 respondents in Tallinn and 59 people in Narva. Russian speaking young people were surveyed in an additional random sample and 133 young people up to 29 years of age were surveyed in Tallinn and 48 in Narva. The situation in Tallinn and Narva is very different (see Figure 2). The relative proportion of Estonian Russians in Tallinn with active language proficiency in 2005 was 48%, while this proportion was 12% in Narva.

Those with uncertain language proficiency numbered 36% in Tallinn, 26% in Narva. The proportion of unilingual Estonian Russians in Tallinn was 16% and 62% in Narva.




Figure 2: Appraisals by Estonian Russians of their proficiency in Estonian according to place of residence (%)

The language proficiency of 70% of young people up to 29 years of age in Tallinn was active in 2005, compared with 22% of young people in Narva. At the same time, 27% of young people in Tallinn considered their proficiency in Estonian to be uncertain, compared with 40% of young people in Narva. Finally, 3% of young people in Tallinn were unilingual, with 38% in Narva. Comparison of the linguistic ability of young people in these two cities clearly indicates that in a multilingual environment like the one that young Estonian Russians experience in Tallinn, it is possible to further one's proficiency in Estonian to the point that the group of unilingual individuals practically does not exist. The relative proportion of unilingual young people in Narva, though, is remarkably large (38%).

The proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians living in Tallinn evaluated according to the ability to communicate is rather close to the average language proficiency of Estonian Russians in Estonia. The ability of Russian speakers living in Narva to communicate in Estonian, however, is considerably lower. This indicates that the proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians in other regions of Estonia (in Tartu, Pärnu and smaller cities in the counties) is in turn considerably better than in the capital. This is an understandable tendency that was known previously. *The smaller the Russian speaking community in one or another region of Estonia, the better the language proficiency (ability to communicate in Estonian) of the Estonian Russians living there.* The results of the survey indicate that the proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians living in county centres (including Tartu and Pärnu) is best, as the proficiency in Estonian of 61% is active, 30% is uncertain and only 9% is unilingual. Since the city of Jõhvi is also included in these regions as the county centre of northeastern Estonia, the proportion of unilingual Estonian Russians comes primarily from among the residents of Jõhvi.

Problems that require a strategic approach and further comprehensive analysis:

1. How to foster the learning of Estonian and develop language proficiency in those young Estonian Russians who continually live in an exclusively Russian language communication environment and who have no everyday practical need to use Estonian. First and foremost, northeastern Estonia, and particularly Narva, are these kinds of regions. The present education and language policy does not officially differentiate Russian schools in northeastern Estonia together with their problems from Russian schools in other regions of Estonia. It is extremely complicated for Russian schools in northeastern Estonia to achieve the same kinds of results compared to Russian schools in Tallinn. It is possible for young Estonian Russians in Tallinn to continually develop their proficiency in Estonian in an Estonian linguistic environment if they want to. This is an opportunity at least for those Russian speaking young people who wish to improve their language proficiency themselves. There is no such opportunity in Narva and as a result, there is no reason to believe that the active proficiency in Estonian of young people in Narva will rapidly improve since there is no Estonian language environment for communication. It is possible for those who have already learned Estonian to practice and develop it only through club activity or through the influence of one-time impulses (short-term language practice, language camps during summer vacation, and so on).
2. The lack of active proficiency in Estonian in northeastern Estonia also does not foster a sense of security and perspective for the future. If the present citizenship requirements remain unchanged, there is no reason to believe that the number of applicants in northeastern Estonia for Estonian citizenship will increase significantly. Poor language proficiency does not create favourable conditions, although the desire of young people to acquire Estonian citizenship for themselves exists as a dream.
3. Possible strategies for behaviour of young Estonian Russians in northeastern Estonia. The main scenario is “leaving northeastern Estonia”. Young people with better proficiency in Estonian and foreign languages aspire to study elsewhere (Tartu, Tallinn, Europe, Russia). After graduating from (post-secondary) school, young people from northeastern Estonia accept more tempting challenges and the return of many educated young people to northeastern Estonia is unlikely. Thus new impulses for the evolution of an Estonian language communication environment in northeastern Estonia do not come about. Organisations like clubs and small informal conversational groups alone are not capable of sufficiently influencing the linguistic environment.

Better Proficiency in Estonian Increases the Inner Self-Confidence of Estonian Russians

Insufficient proficiency in Estonian is definitely an inner barrier for Estonian Russians that makes people dissatisfied with their status, and narrows the opportunities for successfully managing life in Estonia.

Answers to the question, “*Is your proficiency in Estonian sufficient for living in Estonia?*” demonstrate that insufficient language proficiency is a serious psychological barrier to feeling secure in Estonia for a significant portion of local Russian speakers.

Table 2: Evaluations by Estonian Russians of the Adequacy of Their Proficiency in Estonian for Living in Estonia (%)

	2005	2002	1996	1995
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Sufficient language proficiency (completely + generally)	48	44	31	28
Insufficient language proficiency (completely + generally)	49	53	57	55
Undecided	3	3	12	17
Total	100	100	100	100

* Answers to the question: “Is your proficiency in Estonian sufficient for you to live in Estonia?”

The situation has improved in ten years. Yet even in 2005, the Estonian Russian community is nevertheless clearly divided into two equally represented groups according to the adequacy of their proficiency in the official language. Half of the Russophones feel linguistic insecurity for living in Estonia and proficiency in Estonian gives the other half of Estonian Russians a feeling of security for managing life in Estonia.

The better proficiency in Estonian of young Estonian Russians is also reflected by their greater sense of self-confidence. More than half (54%) of young Russians consider their proficiency in Estonian to be sufficient for living in Estonia and 45% of them feel that their existing proficiency in Estonian is insufficient for living in Estonia. Nevertheless, 45% of young people who feel insecure in Estonia due to their insufficient language proficiency is still a rather significant proportion of all young Estonian Russians. Insecurity, which arises from insufficient language proficiency, definitely has a much broader meaning. It creates a favourable background for dissatisfaction with oneself and certainly also with the country where one lives.

In Tallinn, 54% of young people (up to 29 years of age) consider their proficiency in Estonian sufficient and 46% insufficient. In Narva, 48% of young people consider their proficiency in Estonian sufficient for living in Estonia and 50% insufficient. The differences in the appraisals of young people from Tallinn and Narva are considerably smaller than the appraisals of those same young people of their proficiency in Estonian. This means that many young people in Narva who continually live in a Russian language environment and who know very little Estonian or do not understand it at all consider this normal for themselves. At least they do not consider their scant knowledge of Estonian to be a problem while living in Estonia. There is no immediate need for proficiency in Estonian for living in a Russian language environment.

Good Proficiency in Estonian Creates the Conditions for Understanding National Citizenship Policy

Respondents were offered a choice of three different responses for evaluating national citizenship policy. First the appraisal that reflects the general attitude of Estonian Russians, “citizenship policy is too strict”. Second, the internationally accepted understanding of Estonian citizenship policy, “citizenship policy corresponds to international requirements”, and third, the understanding of radically nationalistically oriented Estonians, “citizenship policy is too lenient”.

The results of the survey presented in the following table illustrate how evaluations of Estonian Russians with good proficiency in Estonian differ from the evaluations of unilingual respondents.

Table 3: Appraisals by Young (up to 29 years of age) Estonian Russians of National Citizenship Policy Depending on the Language Proficiency of the Evaluators (in 2005, %)

Appraisals of national citizenship policy	Ability of young Estonian Russians to communicate in Estonian		
	Average appraisal of respondents	Appraisals of respondents with good mastery of Estonian*	Appraisals of unilingual respondents **
Estonian citizenship policy is...			
...too strict towards non-Estonians	67	53	86
...appropriate, corresponds to international requirements	25	39	6
...too lenient, harms the interests of the Estonian people	0	0	0
Undecided	8	8	8
Total	100	100	100

* Evaluation of one's own language proficiency: "I can communicate well in Estonian"

** Evaluation of one's own language proficiency: "I cannot communicate at all in Estonian"

Better proficiency in Estonian is the "key" that influences the attitudes of young Estonian Russians and creates conditions for the understanding of Estonia's national citizenship policy. The quite pronounced common attitude of the Estonian Russian community is the notion that Estonia's national citizenship policy is too strict towards non-Estonians living in Estonia. Two-thirds of young people and 70% of all adult non-Estonians have this attitude towards the national citizenship policy, which first of all indicates the overall unity of Estonian Russians concerning this issue. Secondly, this is in a certain sense an attitude of protest that is expressed in the attitude towards the state and in setting oneself in contrast to the state. This attitude indirectly expresses the understanding of Estonian Russians that the state is unjust toward them in its development of citizenship policy.

The survey indicated that "good" proficiency in Estonian is precisely the criterion that starts to influence the attitude of young Estonian Russians toward national citizenship policy. Young people who evaluated their proficiency in Estonian as "average" tended more often to believe that national citizenship policy is too strict towards non-Estonians. Unilingual non-Estonians represented the most extreme viewpoints of the Estonian Russian community.

It can be presumed that respondents who considered their language proficiency to be good are fluent in Estonian, interact more with Estonians and are influenced more by the understandings of Estonians concerning citizenship policy. A total of 61% of Estonians felt that Estonian citizenship policy corresponds to international requirements, 17% considered citizenship policy too lenient and 7% considered it too strict.

Primary Sources for Learning Estonian

In the survey, we ascertained which sources for learning Estonian are considered the most essential by Estonian Russians themselves. We measured the significance of sources for learning language in two ways. First of all, respondents could name all important sources from where their knowledge of Estonian originates. A total of 14 possible choices/response options were offered. Secondly, respondents were asked to select one source for learning Estonian that was most important for them. People who knew Estonian at least on some level answered this question.

Table 4: Most Important Sources for Learning Estonian

Most important sources for learning Estonian*	%
1. Lessons in basic compulsory and grammar school/secondary school	52
2. Everyday conversation in shops, at the market, in service establishments, and others	45
3. Conversation with fellow employees	40
4. Language courses	36
5. Conversation with friends/acquaintances/neighbours	30
6. Independent language study	29
7. Television/radio broadcasts	20
8. Vocational secondary educational institutions, post-secondary school	19
9.-10. Childhood friends, schoolmates	15
9.-10. Reading newspapers/magazines/books	15
11.-12. Private lessons	10
11.-12. Home, parents, relatives	10
13. Kindergarten	5
14. Indulging in hobbies, hobby clubs	3

* Respondents could name all sources for learning Estonian that were important for them. Each respondent could name several sources, therefore the sum of percentages is greater than 100.

General education school is naturally the most important as a source for learning Estonian alongside other sources. The relatively modest position of general educational school (52% of respondents have named it), however, can be explained by the fact that 51% of all adult Estonian Russians were born in Estonia and therefore have also attended school in Estonia. The remaining 49% of respondents were born outside of Estonia and of them, only those people who moved to Estonia as children have attended school in Estonia.

Everyday conversation is in second place in the choices of people from the standpoint of learning Estonian. This factor, though, assists in learning the language only in those regions where Estonian Russians can be in an Estonian language environment for (everyday) communication on a daily basis. Everyday conversation is not a factor in developing proficiency in Estonian for people living in northeastern Estonia and above all in Narva.

The more important sources for learning Estonian (an important source for at least 1/3 of Estonian Russians) are also conversation with fellow employees (important for 40% of people) and participation in language courses (36%).

Estonians and Estonian Russians have little common space for communication outside of work and everyday life. The relative unimportance of childhood friends and acquaintances and all manner of hobby clubs in learning Estonian is evidence of this. The reading of newspapers, magazines and literature is also of little importance in the development of skills in Estonian.

The following ranking list indicates which source for learning Estonian is considered the most important by Estonian Russians (see Table 5). Respondents had to select only one of the above-mentioned fourteen sources as the one that is most important for them from the standpoint of learning the language. Again, only those Estonian Russians who know Estonian responded.

Table 5: Appraisals by Estonian Russians of the One Source Most Important for Them in Learning Estonian (in 2005, %)

Most important source for learning Estonian	Estonian Russians who were born...
---	------------------------------------

	...in Estonia	...outside of Estonia
General education school	32	7
Language courses	16	31
Conversation with fellow employees	15	22
Vocational school, post-secondary school	8	3
Home, parents, relatives	7	2
Conversation with friends, acquaintances, neighbours	6	5
Everyday conversation	3	14
Private lessons	3	3
Independent language study	2	6
Other sources	8	7
Total	100	100

* **Sources of little importance** (named by 2% or less of all respondents):

-- kindergarten / -- childhood friends, schoolmates / -- hobby clubs

-- TV or radio / -- newspapers, magazines and books

Data from the survey indicates that language study in general educational schools is of relatively little significance as the primary source of learning Estonian. Estonian learned at general educational school is the most important source for 32% of Estonian Russians born in Estonia. Considering the fact that further learning of Estonian and practicing of the language is made more difficult for a large proportion of Estonian Russians (there is no language environment and common space for communication with Estonians), the role of school is very passive.

Language courses are important primarily for people who have arrived from abroad. They are an important target group in carrying out language courses. Media channels are not important in supporting language learning. The reason, of course, is the orientation of Russian speaking inhabitants of Estonia to the information space of Russia, above all Russian television channels.

Passing the Standard Estonian Language Examination

Passing the standard Estonian language examination is one criterion by which it is possible to evaluate the proficiency in Estonian or practical linguistic ability of Estonian Russians. The results of the survey of 2005 are based on the self-evaluation of respondents, the answers to the question, *Do you have a certificate of the Estonian language examination and what is the highest level of your language proficiency?*

According to data from the study, 50% of adult Estonian Russians claim that they have a certificate of the Estonian language examination and 50% of respondents have not taken the standard Estonian language examination. The old (6 categories) and new (3 levels) orders of the standard Estonian language examination, which have been made congruent, are simultaneously valid in Estonia.

Table 6: Evaluations by Adult Estonian Russians Concerning Passing the Standard Estonian Language Examination (in 2005, %)

Passing the Estonian language examination and the category of level accredited	% of respondents
Elementary level or categories A or B	17
Intermediate level or categories C or D	26
High level or categories E or F	7

58% of Estonian Russians presently working have taken the standard Estonian language examination, of them 18% of Estonian Russians at the elementary level, 30% at the intermediate level and 10% at the high level.

The standard Estonian language examination is required for specific jobs associated with serving clients in a broad sense. Working Estonian Russians need to use Estonian in their work 66% of the time and English 18% of the time.

2. Gymnasium Reform of 2007

The gymnasium reform of 2007 and its central idea, partial conversion from Russian to Estonian as the language of instruction in Russian schools at the grammar school level, has long been an important objective of Estonia's integration and education policy. The first attempt to carry out reform was formulated in the 1990's and the initial vision of reform was very radical. Russian gymnasiums were to convert entirely to Estonian as the language of instruction (in all subjects) by the year 2000. Since there were no prerequisites for implementing reform by 2000, the implementation of reform was postponed to 2007. The content of reform has continually been mitigated through new regulations. Conversion to instruction in Estonian at the grammar school level will begin in 2007 according to the present conception. Which subjects will start being taught in Estonian has not been precisely determined. What kind of freedom of choice schools have in planning the speed of transition to instruction in Estonian and in selecting the subjects to be taught in Estonian is also unclear.

As we know, the objective of reform is teaching 60% of subjects in Estonian at Russian language gymnasiums. How long this transition process will be and whether it will be the same in all Russian schools has not been precisely determined at the moment.

Preparation for and implementation of educational reform of such important social significance is a complicated and long-term process, since it requires fundamental changes in the organisation of teaching at Russian schools. Gymnasium reform requires Russian schools to adopt personnel policy at a new level, the large-scale retraining of teachers working there and the selection of new teachers based on the needs of the reform of 2007.

The gymnasium reform of 2007 indirectly affects the Estonian Russian community living in Estonia as a whole since this change is of very essential social significance for the Russian speaking population of Estonia.

The political decision of legislators forms the basis for the planning of gymnasium reform. The positive side of reform is that teaching in Estonian in gymnasiums should fundamentally accelerate the learning of Estonian by Russian speaking young people and foster the integration of Russian speakers into Estonian society through better knowledge of the language. On the other hand, there are many issues that hinder gymnasium reform and are thus far unresolved. When Russian schools were given the assignment of preparing for transition to instruction in Estonian in grammar schools, in other words to carry out preparations for significant changes, this would have also implied the additional funding of Russian schools. In addition to additional funding, there should also have been an integral nationwide reform preparation plan that establishes all activities to be prepared and the essential key points of the transition. It is, however, not possible to open up an additional

financing programme without a precise action plan. This kind of nationwide preparation for reforming Russian schools, however, has not taken place.

Presently, two years prior to the beginning of the reform, the effectiveness of the reform remains unclear because the other party is not active and motivated in preparing for the reform of Russian schools. Russian schools themselves are not interested in reform since the schools understand that many teachers who are incapable of teaching their subject in Estonian will lose their jobs in the course of the transition. Many school principals who are incapable of organising the transition to instruction in Estonian at the required level will also lose their jobs. Thus Russian schools instead secretly work against the reform.

It was not possible for the team of sociologists to thoroughly concentrate on studying the preparation for gymnasium reform in the survey of 2005. The objective of the survey was to provide a general evaluation progress in the integration process. We can nevertheless analyse the general attitudes and understandings of the Estonian population concerning the gymnasium reform of 2007 based on data from the study.




Figure 3: Evaluations by Estonians and Estonian Russians concerning the grammar school reform of 2006

In our survey, we asked for the appraisals of both Estonians and Estonian Russians concerning the gymnasium reform of 2007. The question of the survey was formulated as follows: *Current Estonian legislation prescribes that as of 2007, young people studying at Russian language grammar schools will begin learning 60% of their subjects in Estonian and 40% in Russian. How do you feel about this?* We used bipolarity in constructing the options for response. Approval on the one hand, or a positive attitude, and a negative attitude on the other hand founded on the fear of losing identity.

It is clearly apparent from the comparative analysis of the attitudes of Estonians and Estonian Russians that the decision to reform gymnasiums in 2007 is more clearly comprehensible for Estonians than for non-Estonians (see Table 7). The planning of the political decision of legislators is based primarily on the understandings of Estonians. Estonians are at least optimists and believe in the effectiveness of the reform regulation of 2007.

Table 7: Evaluations by Estonians and Estonian Russians of Grammar School Reform of 2007 (%)

Evaluation of grammar school reform	All respondents		Young people (up to 29 years of age)	
	Estonian Russians	Estonians	Estonian Russians	Estonians
A. Good decision, improves chances for young Russians to manage in Estonia	34	76	30	79
B. I question the decision, young Russians can lose their identity, fluency in Russian and ties to Russian culture	57	9	55	6
Undecided	9	15	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100

There are no essential differences in the evaluations of young people and adults. Estonian young people have the same kinds of attitudes and understandings as adult Estonians. And also Russian young people are similar in their evaluations to adult Estonian Russians.

The fear of over half of Estonian Russians concerning the consequences of reform can be considered the main problem. Estonian Russians fear that the grammar school reform of 2007 can harm the identity of Russian speaking young people and the learning of the Estonian language can impair fluency in Russian.

Thus the attitudes of Russian speaking residents concerning reform are more sceptical and negative toward the reform.

One possible interpretation is that Estonian Russians do not have a positive attitude concerning gymnasium reform since they are not convinced that this is the best approach for improving the proficiency in Estonian of young Russians.

The following data (see Table 8) are also based on the survey of 2005 and indicate that in the opinion of Estonian Russians, the best scenario for young people learning Estonian would be increasing the number of hours of lessons teaching Estonian and improvement in the effectiveness of teaching Estonian. This means that nowadays, two years prior to grammar school reform, Estonian Russians support the evolutionary scenario of teaching Estonian.

Table 8: Evaluations by Estonian Russians of Possible Options for Reform of 2007 (%)

Possible options for reform	All Estonian Russians	Young Estonian Russians (up to 29 years of age)
The number of hours of Estonian language lessons should be increased but subjects should be taught in Russian	61	64
Some subjects should be taught in Estonian	24	24
Over half of subjects should be taught in Estonian	8	8
Undecided	7	4
Total	100	100

In the present vision of Estonian Russians, the best option is a gradual transition to the more in-depth teaching of Estonian. If given a choice, only one out of every twelve Estonian Russians would support the present version of gymnasium reform.

Proficiency in Estonian of non-Estonians (%)

Appraisals of one's own language proficiency	Estonian citizens				Russian citizens				Stateless			
	2005	2002	2000	1997	2005	2002	2000	1997	2005	2002	2000	1997
I understand verbal conversation in Estonian												
• Well	45	48	47	42	0	5	7	6	9	15	8	11
• Moderately	30	24	32	28	22	16	15	26	30	26	29	26
• A little	16	22	13	24	39	26	39	34	45	43	41	41
• Not at all	9	6	8	6	39	53	39	34	16	16	22	22
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
I know how to read in Estonian												
• Well	49	49	49	39	6	5	7	11	12	20	25	7
• Moderately	26	29	31	23	9	14	17	19	28	26	22	24
• A little	14	14	13	29	30	26	30	24	40	38	29	40
• Not at all	11	8	7	9	55	55	46	46	20	16	24	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
I know how to write in Estonian												
• Well	34	34	34	29	0	1	6	6	7	10	12	7
• Moderately	37	32	31	25	8	11	12	20	27	29	24	22
• A little	16	25	26	33	23	23	26	22	39	32	31	34
• Not at all	13	9	9	13	69	65	56	52	27	29	33	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
I can communicate in Estonian												
• Well	40	40	39	38	0	3	6	5	5	11	4	5
• Moderately	31	26	33	24	5	13	10	18	20	22	25	18
• A little	17	24	18	23	44	23	34	37	49	38	37	40
• Not at all	12	10	10	15	51	61	50	40	26	29	34	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Tolerance in Ethnic Relations in Estonia

Iris Pettai

Concerning the Concept of Tolerance

Tolerance is the capacity for bearing differences. The more tolerant people are, the less they reject everything foreign and try to draw a boundary between 'us' and 'them'. The basis for tolerance is the disposition towards culture that presumes that people can manage to subject their behaviour to certain rules and requirements founded on equality and non-aggression. The capacity to tolerate differences is a question of upbringing. The more primitive a society is, the less differences, other cultures, being different are tolerated, and the stronger standards of uniformity are, the more careful people are concerning differences. The development of tolerance means teaching people to control their attitudes and behaviour in order to prevent hostility and aggressiveness.

The attitude towards differences is the key question in organising coexistence throughout the world. Only in a tolerant country is it possible to prevent sharp ethnic conflicts and ensure secure coexistence. Of the 200 countries of the world, only 20 homogeneous countries remain where the relative proportion of other nationalities remains less than 5%. Thus most countries have to make an effort to increase tolerance.

Tolerant people have fewer prejudices and stereotypes in relation to other nationalities. They have managed to overcome barriers of rejection and do not feel uncomfortable when coming into contact with people of other nationalities. The basis for tolerance is often a positive personal experience (working for an employer with a mixed group of employees and actively communicating with a representative of another nationality).

Many developmental phases can be distinguished when considering tolerance. The most elementary phase is **passive tolerance**, which is expressed through an indifferent attitude toward other nationalities. Passive tolerance is more like bearing or enduring and can mean a concealed sense of superiority. **Conscious tolerance** is a qualitatively new phase founded on mutual understanding and appreciation. This comes about when sufficient information concerning another nationality is available but first and foremost, when there is interest in obtaining this information either by direct communication or in some other way. A foreign nationality becomes open and its behaviour becomes predictable. When mutual contact comes about, the sense of danger and the need to maintain distance and create barriers decrease. **Active tolerance** means recognition based on mutual appreciation of one another.

Tolerance is in contrast with **intolerance**, which means rejection and the wish not to interact with, live near, or work with representatives of another nationality and so on. Intolerant people adhere to the principle that one must be careful and mistrustful in relation to whatever is foreign. They try to maintain a certain distance in relation to other nationalities and to isolate themselves as far as possible from them.

We based our analysis of the tolerance of Estonians on the following attributes:

1. **Level of inclination to conflict** – how frequently do conflicts, quarrels and disagreements occur on an ethnic level? How sharp are these conflicts? Do they lead to physical clashes?
2. **Sense of danger in relation to Estonian Russians** – to what extent is there a feeling of security in relation to Estonian Russians.
3. **Openness to social interaction** – willingness to work under the management of a Russian/Estonian superior, to live together in one building, and so on.
4. **Willingness to work together** with foreign manpower from other countries.
5. **Capacity for empathy in terms of Estonian Russians** – willingness to understand their problems, the wish to help them.

Sense of Danger is Fading Away

The changes that have taken place over the past 12 years in Estonia’s ethnic relations are positive in every respect. As recently as 1993, two thirds of Estonians and three quarters of Estonian Russians considered ethnic relations to be strained. By 2005, sharp conflicts and oppositions on the level of ethnic relations have become almost nonexistent. The fears and sense of danger of Estonians are disappearing. In 1999, over two thirds of Estonians considered Estonian Russians to be a danger to the continuation of the Estonian nationality. In 2005, only 16% of Estonians feel the same way.

Serious conflicts are rare

One integration problem is continual friction on the ethnic level. Nearly half of respondents observe cases of conflict.

Table 1: Observation of Cases of Conflict in 2000 – 2005 (often + sometimes, %)

	Estonians		Estonian Russians	
	2000	2005	2000	2005
In the media	40	43	28	32
In public places	39	45	47	44
In the vicinity of the home, in the streets	21	26	12	22
In national institutions	11	10	32	25
At work	...	8	...	14

* Responses to the question: “Have you observed conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians, hostile attitudes towards Estonians or non-Estonians over the last 2 years?”

According to the monitoring study, only 1 to 7% of Estonians and Estonian Russians frequently experience conflicts or quarrels on ethnic grounds. Conflicts are limited primarily to arguments and do not develop into physical clashes. Conflicts are noticed more frequently in the media and in public places. Conflicts or hostile attitudes on the grounds of ethnic relations are rarely found at work. According to the monitoring study, it can be concluded that the treatment of non-Estonians in governmental institutions has improved somewhat because while five years ago,

every third non-Estonian noticed a hostile attitude or conflict situations there, nowadays every fourth feels that way.

The Willingness of Estonians to Interact Socially With Non-Estonians Has Grown

Willingness to interact socially with others as an indicator of tolerance is measured in terms of specific situations. Four social interaction situations were considered both in 1999 and 2005:

- 1) living in the same building
- 2) working under the management of a Russian/Estonian superior
- 3) membership in a club/society for spending one’s free time together with Russians/Estonians.
- 4) being a patient of a Russian/Estonian doctor.

Different evaluation scales were used in 1999 and 2005 to measure willingness to interact socially. The evaluation scale used in 1999 measured willingness as the wish to do something together: to live in the same building, to spend free time in a club together, and so on, which is an indicator of an active need for social interaction. The scale used in 2005 measured more passive attitudes and on this basis, respondents had to appraise whether or not they had anything against coming into contact with a representative of another nationality in certain situations. In order to appraise the number of tolerant people as a whole in 1999 and 2005, the opinions of respondents in favour of social interaction and those of respondents who gave an indifferent appraisal were added together in the following table (see Table 2). Tolerance theorists consider indifferent attitude to also be tolerant.

The willingness of Estonians to live near Estonian Russians, to work together with them, and so on, is relatively high – 2/3 are willing to do so. Willingness in two situations (to live in the same building and to work under the management of a Russian superior) has increased by 9% in six years among Estonians. Willingness in two situations has remained at the same level: to visit a club for spending free time together with Estonian Russians, and to be a patient of a Russian doctor.

The willingness of young (up to 29 years of age) Estonians to interact socially with Estonian Russians was slightly higher than among Estonians as a whole in 1999. By 2005, the willingness of young Estonians to interact socially has decreased somewhat compared to 1999, thus dropping below that of Estonians as a whole. Willingness to be a patient of a Russian doctor has dropped especially perceptibly, from 67% to 53%. The reason may be deterioration in fluency in Russian among young people, which could make young people cautious in terms of choosing a Russian doctor.

Table 2: Willingness to Interact Socially in 1999¹ – 2005 (%)

Estonians		Estonian Russians	
I would like to + I am indifferent	I have nothing against it + I am indifferent	I would like to + I am indifferent	I have nothing against it + I am indifferent
1999	2005	1999	2005

¹ Estonian Open Society Institute monitoring study 1999

To live with Russians/ Estonians in the same building	EP	62	71	95	97
	Y	71	68	95	97
To be a member of a club/society for spending free time together with Russians/ Estonians	EP	68	68	86	89
	Y	69	65	87	87
To work as an employee where the superior is a Russian/ Estonian	EP	52	61	85	89
	Y	54	56	83	82
To be a patient of a Russian/ Estonian doctor	EP	60	58	89	88
	Y	67	53	88	85

* Responses to the question: “How would you feel if you had to...?”

** EP – entire population; Y – young people

The willingness of Estonian Russians to interact socially is significantly higher. Nearly 90% are willing to live side-by-side with Estonians and to work together. In terms of the four situations under consideration, the willingness of Estonian Russians to interact socially, which was already very high in 1999, has remained practically the same. Changes in the direction of positive growth have extended by a few percentage points.

The willingness of young (up to 29 years of age) Estonian Russians to interact socially with Estonians was also very high in 1999 already and did not differ from the attitude of Estonian Russians as a whole. By 2005, no major changes have taken place in the willingness of young Estonian Russians.

We observe in the table below how attitudes of rejection have changed in the period from 1999 to 2005. Attitudes of rejection were also measured in terms of the four situations of social interaction mentioned above. The categorical version: “I would not want to interact socially” was used to measure the attitude of rejection in 1999. A more moderate version: “It would be better if I did not have to interact socially” was used in 2005.

Table 3: Absence of Willingness to Interact Socially in 1999² – 2005 (%)

		Estonians		Estonian Russians	
		I wouldn't want to	Better if I didn't have to	I wouldn't want to	Better if I didn't have to
		1999	2005	1999	2005
To live with Russians/ Estonians in the same building	EP	36	25	3	3
	Y	28	28	2	4
To be a member of a	EP	29	23	12	8

² Estonian Open Society Institute monitoring study 1999

club/society for spending free time together with Russians/ Estonians	Y	29	28	10	12
To work as an employee where the superior is a Russian/ Estonian	EP	45	32	13	10
	Y	44	37	15	15
To be a patient of a Russian/ Estonian doctor	EP	38	37	10	11
	Y	32	43	11	15

* Responses to the question: "How would you feel if you had to...?"

** EP – entire population; Y – young people

The attitude of rejection has decreased among Estonians over the course of six years in all situations. The decrease in relation to working for a Russian superior has been particularly noticeable. While nearly half of Estonians considered it unacceptable to work under the management of an Estonian Russian superior six years ago, only one third do not wish to do so in 2005. The relative proportion of those Estonians who do not want to be a patient of a Russian doctor has remained at the same level.

Only 3-11% of Estonian Russians reject social interaction. Estonian Russians tend more to reject the same situations as Estonians: working as an employee where the superior is Estonian or being a patient of an Estonian doctor.

The attitude of rejection of young (up to 29 years of age) Estonians has increased in relation to Russian doctors by 11% over the course of six years. Rejection of Estonian Russian superiors has decreased by 7%. The relative proportion of young people who do not wish to live in the same building with Estonian Russians or to spend time together with them in some club for spending free time has remained the same.

The Condition of Feeling Disturbed is not the same as Intolerance

Monitoring studies carried out in recent years indicate a rather high level of feelings of disturbance among Estonians in relation to Estonian Russians. According to data from the monitoring study of 2005, 80% of Estonians are disturbed by the fact that Estonian Russians do not know Estonian, 78% consider their way of life and thinking to be different from those of Estonian Russians, 59% of Estonians are disturbed by the difference in behaviour and lifestyle of Estonian Russians.

Estonians disturb Estonian Russians considerably less. Only 3% of Estonian Russians are intensely disturbed and 23% are somewhat disturbed by the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Estonians.

Two questions can be posed. First, how is it that with such a high level of disturbance among Estonians, there are few serious conflicts in Estonia on the grounds of ethnic relations? Second, how is it that regardless of the high level of disturbance, the majority of Estonians (about 2/3) is nevertheless willing to work together with Estonian Russians, live near them, spend their free time together, and so on.

One possible explanation for peaceful coexistence is the fact that the disturbance felt by Estonians is relatively moderate, since only 10% of Estonians are intensely disturbed by the differing behaviour and lifestyle of Estonian Russians, and 49% feel slightly disturbed. Estonians also do not consider their lifestyle and way of thinking to be in sharp contrast with those of Estonian Russians. Only one fifth of Estonians considers their lifestyle and way of thinking to be completely different from those of Estonian Russians. The lifestyles and ways of thinking of the two nationalities are more different rather than similar in the opinion of 57%.

The lack of knowledge of Estonian among Estonian Russians disturbs Estonians the most and thus every third Estonian feels intensely disturbed, while 46% feel somewhat disturbed.

It is also important to distinguish between intolerance and feeling disturbed. They are indeed phenomena that are closely associated with each other, yet they nevertheless cannot be considered equivalent. Both express negative reaction to the peculiarities, attributes and behavioural traits of another nationality that are disturbing and may be irritating. At the same time, feeling disturbed is a considerably more moderate form of negative reaction than intolerance. The feeling of disturbance primarily means relating to something – appraisals and attitudes towards phenomena that are negative and unpleasant for a person. People do not necessarily show that they are feeling disturbed, particularly if they are only somewhat disturbed. Intolerance, however, does not remain within the framework of appraisals and opinions alone and is very likely manifested in the behaviour of a person. The intolerant person actively rejects what he does not approve of and he tries to demonstrate this through his behaviour. People who are intolerant in relation to another nationality are ordinarily incapable of working together with representatives of that nationality in a mixed working environment. If they find themselves living together in the same building, they try to move away from there at the first opportunity.

Thus one and the same person can simultaneously be both disturbed as well as tolerant in relation to another nationality. Of course, this is possible in the event that the feeling of disturbance is moderate. And thus the situation in Estonia is that 59% of Estonians are indeed disturbed by the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Estonian Russians but this does not hinder 2/3 of them from being tolerant in relation to Estonian Russians. This leads to the conclusion that the disturbance felt by Estonians is not intense enough to directly disturb living and working side-by-side and to force them to distance themselves completely from Estonian Russians.

The Arrival of Foreign Manpower from the Nordic Countries and the European Union is related to With Tolerance

Table 4: Attitude Toward the Arrival of Foreign Manpower (%)

		Estonians		Estonian Russians	
		I would have nothing against it + I am indifferent	Better if they did not come	I would have nothing against it + I am indifferent	Better if they did not come
From the Nordic countries	EP	68	28	88	16

	Y	73	24	84	15
From countries in the European Union	EP	61	34	80	17
	Y	73	24	81	17
From Russia	EP	36	60	84	14
	Y	43	54	85	14
Asian countries (for example China)	EP	21	72	36	60
	Y	24	68	39	58
From African countries	EP	21	73	33	63
	Y	26	68	39	57
From Turkey	EP	19	74	34	62
	Y	25	70	37	60

* Answers to the question: “How would you relate to people from the following countries if they came to Estonia to live and work...?”

** EP – entire population; Y – young people

The Nordic countries and the countries of the European Union are two regions from where the import of manpower is not a particular problem for Estonians or Estonian Russians. Manpower coming from Russia is also favourable in the opinion of Estonian Russians, who are least apt to reject emigrants coming from Russia. Only one third of Estonians are in favour of manpower coming from Russia, while 60% of Estonians reject this notion.

There is widespread opposition to manpower coming from countries in Asia and Africa, and from Turkey. Three quarters of Estonians do not want to see manpower from these countries in Estonia and 2/3 of Estonian Russians feel likewise.

Estonian Russians are noticeably more willing to accept foreign manpower than Estonians. Estonians as a whole are significantly less willing to interact socially with people of foreign cultures than Estonian Russians. The willingness of Estonians to work together with people from the Nordic countries, who are rather similar to Estonians in terms of their culture and disposition, is greater (68%).

The willingness of young Estonians (up to 29 years of age) to accept foreign manpower is somewhat greater than that of Estonians as a whole. The difference in relation to manpower from the EU countries and from Russia is especially noticeable. Even young people are also negatively disposed toward manpower from Asian and African countries and Turkey.

The willingness of young (up to 29 years of age) Estonian Russians to accept foreign manpower is not significantly different from that of all Estonian Russians and is greater than that of young Estonians.

Those groups that are more successful, manage better in life, have a high opinion of their capability to compete in Estonia and in other countries and who feel secure in terms of the future (see Appendix 1) are more tolerant toward foreign manpower. They calmly view the import of manpower into Estonia from elsewhere, believing in their abilities and not fearing that competition will crowd them out of the labour market.

Those Estonians who work in a mixed working environment and are not disturbed by the peculiarities of Estonian Russians are more tolerant.

Younger Estonian Russians born in Estonia with Estonian citizenship and fluent in Estonian who consider themselves Nordic people or Europeans are more tolerant.

Less successful people less capable of competing who are less satisfied with their lives are more often negative in their attitude toward foreign manpower (see Appendix 1). Even now they already feel uncertain on the labour market and it can be presumed that they fear that supplementary manpower can make their situation even worse.

Among Estonians, older people, pensioners and workers are negatively disposed toward foreign manpower. Among Estonian Russians, the same goes for older people, pensioners, stateless persons or Russian citizens who have poor knowledge of Estonian.

The Position of Estonians is Considered Significantly Higher Than That of Estonian Russians

Table 5: Appraisals of the Position of Estonians and Estonian Russians in Estonian Society (%)

	Estonians	Estonian Russians			
		All	Estonian citizen	Stateless	Russian citizen
Position of Estonians is considerably higher	25	56	44	71	58
Position of Estonians is somewhat higher	48	31	39	19	32
Non-Estonians and Estonians are equal in position	19	12	15	9	7
Position of non-Estonians is somewhat higher	2	1	2
Position of non-Estonians is considerably higher
DIFFICULT TO SAY	6	1	1	...	1

* Responses to the question: "How do you evaluate the position of Estonians and Estonian Russians in Estonian society?"

The position of Estonians is higher than that of Estonian Russians according to 73% of Estonians and 87% of Estonian Russians. A total of 19% of Estonians and 12% of Estonian Russians consider their positions to be equal. Only 1-2% of the population believes that the position of Estonian Russians is higher than that of Estonians. In real life, the incomes and occupational status of Estonian Russians do not differ significantly from those of Estonians, thus this data is an indication of preconceived attitudes to a great extent.

Estonian Russians perceive differences in position compared to Estonians significantly more sharply than Estonians. While only every fourth Estonian considers the position of Estonians to be considerably higher, over half of Estonian Russians (56%) feel this way. Stateless Estonian Russians perceive differences in position more sharply, as nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of them consider the position of Estonians to be considerably higher. The same applies to Russian citizens, of whom 58% consider the position of Estonians to be considerably higher.

Young Estonian Russians who are Estonian citizens and fluent in Estonian, and have managed to adapt well in Estonian society feel that they are much more on a par as citizens than stateless and older Estonian Russians with poor knowledge of the Estonian language. Younger Estonians who work in mixed working environments and are not bothered by the peculiarities of Estonian Russians consider their positions to be more on a par (see Appendix 2).

The appraisal of the positions of Estonians and Estonian Russians is an indicator that gives evidence of the isolation and relative lack of integration of minority nationalities in Estonian society. Since more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population, both Estonians and Estonian Russians, automatically place Estonians in a higher position, this is a diagnosis of Estonian society, which means that it is considered quite inevitable that Estonian Russians have lower status. Unfortunately, Estonian Russians themselves have also accepted this kind of negative diagnosis.

The following conclusions may be drawn:

- ◆ Estonian Russians are relatively little integrated and also in an isolated state in Estonian society
- ◆ strong sense of disposition prevails in Estonian society: **Estonia is first and foremost a society of the majority nationality, or Estonians**, where Estonian Russians occupy a considerably lower position.
- ◆ The starting position of Estonian Russians is weaker due to their nationality alone already
- ◆ The capability of Estonian Russians to compete and their ability to succeed in Estonian society is inhibited due to their nationality

APPRAISALS OF ESTONIANS	APPRAISALS OF ESTONIAN RUSSIANS
<p data-bbox="233 323 857 394"><i>Relate tolerantly to foreign manpower coming from the Nordic and EU countries</i></p> <ul data-bbox="250 436 863 919" style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Have a high opinion of their capability to compete in the labour market in Estonia and in other countries ◆ Highly willing to interact socially with Estonian Russians ◆ Consider their way of thinking to be similar to that of Estonian Russians ◆ Estonian Russians do not bother them ◆ Consider present citizenship policy to be too strict ◆ Younger ◆ Satisfied with how Estonia is being governed 	<p data-bbox="883 323 1458 394"><i>Relate tolerantly to foreign manpower coming from the Nordic and EU countries</i></p> <ul data-bbox="899 436 1448 991" style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Highly willing to leave Estonia temporarily to work in other countries ◆ Younger ◆ Born in Estonia ◆ Estonian citizens ◆ Consider themselves Nordic people or Europeans ◆ High incomes (over 4000 kroons per month per person) ◆ Have higher education ◆ Satisfied with their work ◆ Satisfied with their economic situation ◆ Positive prognosis of their economic situation in 5 years ◆ Fluent in Estonian
<p data-bbox="233 1064 863 1136"><i>Relate negatively to foreign manpower coming from the Nordic and EU countries</i></p> <ul data-bbox="250 1178 824 1808" style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Not particularly willing and relate negatively to interacting socially with Estonian Russians ◆ Have a low opinion of their capability to compete in the labour market in Estonia and in other countries ◆ Estonian Russians disturb them ◆ Consider present citizenship policy to be too lenient ◆ Dissatisfied with their present economic situation ◆ Pessimistic prognosis of their economic situation in 5 years ◆ Dissatisfied with how Estonia is being governed ◆ Older, retired people ◆ Workers 	<p data-bbox="883 1064 1458 1136"><i>Relate negatively to foreign manpower coming from the Nordic and EU countries</i></p> <ul data-bbox="899 1178 1497 1732" style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Not particularly willing to leave Estonia temporarily to work in other countries ◆ Poor knowledge of Estonian ◆ Have a low opinion of their opportunities to find work in their profession, to make a career, and so on ◆ Dissatisfied with their present economic situation ◆ Pessimistic prognosis of their economic situation in 5 years ◆ Dissatisfied with their present job ◆ Born outside of Estonia ◆ Older, retired people ◆ Stateless ◆ Citizens of Russia

APPENDIX 2

<p style="text-align: center;">APPRAISALS OF ESTONIANS</p> <p>POSITIONS ARE EQUAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Younger ◆ Work in a mixed working environment ◆ Fluent in Russian ◆ Consider their way of thinking to be similar to that of Estonian Russians ◆ Estonian Russians do not bother them ◆ Consider the integration process to be successful ◆ Satisfied with how Estonia is being governed 	<p style="text-align: center;">APPRAISALS OF ESTONIAN RUSSIANS</p> <p>POSITIONS ARE EQUAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Younger ◆ Born in Estonia ◆ Consider Estonia to be their homeland ◆ Estonian citizens ◆ Fluent in Estonian ◆ Way of thinking is similar to that of Estonians ◆ Work in a mixed working environment ◆ Follow Estonian language media ◆ Have not experienced conflicts with Estonians
<p>ESTONIANS ARE IN A SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER POSITION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Do not understand Russian ◆ Older ◆ Consider their way of thinking to be different from that of Estonian Russians ◆ Estonian Russians disturb them ◆ Consider the integration process to be unsuccessful ◆ Have experienced conflicts with Estonian Russians in public places ◆ Do not wish to work with Estonian Russians in the same working environment, or to be a patient of an Estonian Russian doctor ◆ Dissatisfied with how Estonia is being governed 	<p>ESTONIANS ARE IN A SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER POSITION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Older, pensioners, unskilled labourers ◆ Stateless ◆ Russian citizens ◆ Poor knowledge of Estonian ◆ Experience conflict situations with Estonians more often ◆ In their opinion, Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940 ◆ Have a low opinion of their opportunities to find work in their profession, to make a career, and so on

Appraisals of the Success of Integration, Future Dangers, and Manifestations of Negative Attitudes

Jüri Kruusvall

1. Appraisals of the Success of Integration

Respondents evaluated the success of integration in Estonia in three surveys, whereas in 2005, we asked them in addition to also evaluate the progress of integration in their own city or rural municipality. In 2005, 45% of Estonians and 31% of Estonian Russians considered the integration that had taken place thus far to be successful (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Appraisals by Estonians and Estonian Russians of the success of integration in Estonia as a whole and in their own city/rural municipality (%)

Integration thus far has been unsuccessful in the opinion of 36% of Estonians and 57% of Estonian Russians. In addition, more people among Estonians (nearly one fifth) do not know what appraisal to give integration. Two fifths of non-Estonian Estonian citizens consider integration to be successful, while less than one quarter of stateless individuals and Russian citizens feel the same way (see Table 1). More young people up to 29 years of age consider integration to be successful, and this is especially noticeable among stateless individuals and Russian citizens.

Table 1: Appraisals of the Success of Integration in Estonia as a Whole and in One's Own City/Rural Municipality (%)

Year of monitoring study / (% of those considering it successful)	Estonians		Estonian Russians		
	Total	Estonian citizens	Stateless individuals	Russian citizens	
2000	39	22	32	18	10
2002	34	26	33	23	17
2005	45	31	40	23	24

2005 young people up to 29 years old	50	40	43	32	34
2005 in one's own city/rural municipality	58	33	46	25	23
2005 young people up to 29 years old in their own city/rural municipality	57	38	47	30	20

The relative proportion of respondents who considered integration to be successful has increased over the past five years. The increase was smallest in the group of stateless respondents. There are more respondents among young people up to 29 years of age who consider integration to be successful compared to the overall body of respondents in all the groups provided in the table. The difference is greater in the case of stateless Estonian Russians and Russian citizens.

Estonians consider the integration that has taken place in their own city/rural municipality to be more successful than in Estonia as a whole, which can be explained by the fact that many Estonian respondents live in settlements with few non-Estonians where there are almost no integration problems (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Estonian Russians, however, perceive the actual functioning of integration particularly in their own near vicinity. The appraisals of young people of the integration that has taken place in their city/rural municipality do not differ significantly from the average indicators of all respondents. The following table provides an overview of regional differences in evaluating general and local integration:

Table 2: People Who Consider Integration to be Successful by Region (%)

Region / Integration	Tallinn		Eastern Viru County		Remainder of Estonia	
	General	Local	General	Local	General	Local
Estonians	38	45	23	42	48	63
Estonians younger than 29 years old	34	39	*	*	55	63
Non-Estonians	26	30	29	27	40	46
Non-Estonians up to 29 years old	32	37	45	32	46	49

* number of respondents too small

There are fewer people who consider integration to be successful among Estonians in Tallinn and Eastern Viru County than elsewhere in Estonia. Integration in one's own city/rural municipality is appraised more positively than in Estonia as a whole and this is particularly noticeable in the case of Estonians in Eastern Viru County. While there are fewer people satisfied with integration among young Estonians in Tallinn compared to the overall body of respondents, young people elsewhere in Estonia are on the contrary more positively disposed. This refers to problems in the awareness of integration particularly among young people in Tallinn, which is discussed in the section of this report dedicated to identity.

The appraisals by non-Estonians of general and local integration do not differ essentially. There are fewer in Tallinn and Eastern Viru County who considered integration to be successful. The appraisals of non-Estonian young people are better in all localities than in the overall body of respondents. The more positive attitude towards the progress of integration in Estonia as a whole is particularly noticeable among young Russians in Eastern Viru County (45% consider it to be successful).

Table 3 provides an overview of evaluations of integration in terms of age groups. The appraisals by Estonians of the success of integration have improved over the course of five years in all age groups with the exception of the oldest age group (60-74 years old). Compared to the “setback” of 2002, the relative proportion of positive appraisals has increased in all age groups, except for the youngest age group (15-19 years old). The latter circumstance is associated with concern about the awareness of young people of integration, which is discussed in the part of this report dedicated to identity.

Table 3: People Who Consider Integration to be Successful by Age Group (%)

Age group	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-74
Estonians 2000	39	37	45	42	38	33
Estonians 2002	48	42	36	27	28	25
Estonians 2005	45	52	47	50	45	32
Non-Estonians 2000	37	28	12*	21	26	14
Non-Estonians 2002	32	28	36	29	20	17
Non-Estonians 2005	41	39	32	21	23	19

* many stateless respondents in the group

Younger age groups among non-Estonians consider integration to be more successful. An increase in the number of positive evaluations can also be noticed among young people up to 29 years of age. The relative proportion of Estonian Russians 40 years of age and older, however, who consider integration to be successful is less than one quarter.

There are no significant differences among Estonians in terms of gender, but non-Estonian women are conspicuous by their lower appraisals (only 26% of them consider integration successful both in Estonia as a whole as well as in their own city/rural municipality). When the attribute of education is added, it can be said that less educated non-Estonian women in particular evaluate integration more negatively compared to men with the same level of education.

The economic situation is associated more closely with the appraisals of successful integration given in the case of non-Estonians (see Figure 2): the better the economic conditions in which people live, the more people consider integration to be successful.




Figure 2: Appraisals by Estonian Russians of their economic situation and of how Estonia is being governed in association with their appraisals of the success of integration

At the same time, the appraisal given to integration also influences the satisfaction of Estonian Russians with how the country is being governed: 43% of those who consider integration to be successful are also satisfied with how the country is being governed. However, only 3% of those who consider integration to be a complete failure are satisfied with how the country is being governed. This alludes to the fact that Estonian Russians consider dealing with integration to be largely the responsibility of the state, which has emerged already in earlier studies.

The appraisal by Estonian Russians of the success of integration is associated to a significant degree with their knowledge of Estonian. (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Proficiency in Estonian of Estonian Russians and their appraisal of the success of integration

While less than a quarter of Estonian Russians with average or poor proficiency in Estonian consider integration to be successful, 60% of those fluent in Estonian consider integration to be successful. This data refers on the one hand to the fact that knowledge of Estonian is an important factor in a successful integration process, yet on the other hand also to the fact that language proficiency is nevertheless not the only factor (even two fifths of non-Estonians who are fluent in Estonian do not consider integration to be successful).

People who have observed conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians or hostile attitudes toward people of other nationalities consider integration to be less successful (see Figure 4).




Figure 4: Appraisals by Estonians of the success of integration depending on the frequency of observation of conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians

Appraisals of integration by Estonians are also influenced to a certain extent by their attitude toward non-Estonians (see Figure 5). While the disturbance felt by Estonians in regard to the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Russians is more closely associated with evaluations of the success of integration throughout Estonia, disturbance felt due to the poor knowledge of Estonian demonstrated by Russians is more closely associated with appraisals of integration on the local level (in one's own city, rural municipality).




Figure 5: Appraisals by Estonians of integration depending on the degree of disturbance due to the different kind of behaviour of Russians and their lack of knowledge of Estonian

Generally speaking, it can be said in summary that the appraisal given to the success of integration serves as an indicator that is influenced by both the attitude of the


evaluator himself toward the integration process as well as his knowledge and attitudes concerning the general situation in integration.

2. Factors Endangering the Future of Estonians and Estonian Russians in Estonia

In analysing the results of the monitoring study of 2002, we recognised that over 70% (including 35% definitely) of Estonians consider large numbers of non-Estonians living in Estonia to be a danger to the survival of the Estonian people. In this year's study, we tried to measure the sense of danger felt by Estonians somewhat differently compared to previous studies. Namely, we asked respondents to first mark the five most important circumstances from a list of fifteen possible circumstances that may endanger the future of Estonians in Estonia and thereafter all those from the remainder of the list that could also be dangerous. Thus the respondent had the opportunity to freely mark all dangers and on the other hand to categorise them as more dangerous and less dangerous. The given list also included the responses "Russians living in Estonia" and "the increase in the relative importance of the Russian language in social interaction".

The results of the survey indicated that while Estonians marked alcoholism and drug addiction (88%, including 75% among the 5 most important), and poverty and unemployment (85% and 65% respectively) as the greatest dangers, only 16% (including 8% that ranked it as one of the 5 most important dangers) of Estonians considered Russians living in Estonia to be a threat to the future of Estonians, and 11% (3%) respectively felt threatened by increased use of the Russian language. In terms of average danger level, these factors ranked in 12th and 13th place out of 15 (see Figure 6).

Thus we can conclude that **Estonians do not see local Russians and the speaking of Russian as factors endangering their future on the background of other dangers.**



* % of respondents that marked danger out of the total number of Estonians surveyed

Figure 6: Factors that may endanger the future of Estonians in Estonia in the opinion of Estonian respondents

It is also noteworthy that a greater number of Estonians consider the increasing use of English to be an endangering factor (30% marked it among all possible dangers) than those that marked the possible growth in the relative importance of Russian in social interaction. Similarly, the arrival into Estonia of people of other cultures with different skin colours is a greater danger for Estonians (26%) than Russians living in Estonia.

Estonians cannot be accused of concentrating excessively on individual points of view and the absence of representation of nationalist interests, because 53% of those surveyed considered weakening of national culture and patriotism to be dangerous.

There are quite likely two different kinds of reasons for considering Russians and the Russian language to be of relatively little importance as danger factors. Some Estonians (no longer) consider them to be dangerous, others consider the measures adopted by the government of Estonia for the protection of the Estonian language and for limiting the granting of citizenship to be sufficient guarantees to ensure the security of Estonians and the Estonian nationality.

The data presented below indicates that although certain groups of Estonians consider Russians to be more dangerous than average, the number of those who have indicated danger does not increase above one quarter of those surveyed in most cases.




Figure 7: Relative proportion of Estonians according to age and education who consider Russians living in Estonia and increased usage of Russian in social interaction to be dangerous (%)

The sense of danger regarding Russians and the Russian language is somewhat less among younger middle aged Estonians (30-49 years of age) and greater among Estonians with higher education.

In regional terms, the sense of danger of Estonians is greater in Tallinn (25% consider Russians and 15% consider increased usage of the Russian language to be dangerous).




Figure 8: Relative proportion of Estonians who consider Russians living in Estonia and increased usage of the Russian language in social interaction to be dangerous in terms of knowledge of the Russian language and satisfaction with the economic situation (%)

The better the knowledge of Russian and the worse the economic situation of Estonians, the less individuals there are among them who consider Russians and the use of the Russian language to be dangerous (see Figure 8).





Figure 9: Relative proportion of Estonians who consider Russians living in Estonia and increased usage of the Russian language in social interaction to be dangerous depending on how disturbed they are by the lack of proficiency in Estonian of Russians and their different kind of behaviour and lifestyle

Greater numbers of Estonians who are disturbed by the inadequacy of knowledge of Estonian of Russians and their different kind of lifestyle/lifestyle consider them and the use of the Russian language to be dangerous (see Figure 9). In the case of the small group of Estonians that are very disturbed by different behaviour, the sense of danger also rises considerably higher than average (nearly half of them sense danger in Russians).

In considering factors endangering the **future of non-Estonians in Estonia**, we first turn our attention to how other dangers are rendered important in contrast to Estonians (see Figure 10).



* % of respondents that marked danger out of the total number of non-Estonians surveyed

Figure 10: Factors that may endanger the future of Estonian Russians in Estonia in the opinion of non-Estonian respondents

It is notable that Estonian Russians mark most dangers less than Estonians. Thus compared to Estonians, 29% less non-Estonians consider AIDS and other diseases to be dangerous, 21% less emigration from Estonia, 20% less foreign ownership of property, 17% less crime, 16% less weakening of family ties and values, and 15% less alcoholism and drug addiction. Only poverty and unemployment (which is the greatest danger for non-Estonians), weakening of national culture and national identity, caring little about one's fellow man, and the arrival in Estonia of people from other cultures with different skin colour are considered dangerous to about the same degree as in the case of Estonians (and the weakening of the influence of religion and the church, and growing power of women are also insignificant as dangers to Estonian Russians).

At the same time, factors directly associated with integration rank considerably higher in the ranking of dangers by Estonian Russians than in the ranking by Estonians: 69% of non-Estonians consider Estonian citizenship policy to endanger their future (including 46% among the five most important dangers), 45% fear a reduction in the relative importance of Russian in social interaction (including 28% who mention it among the five most important dangers).

Viewed in terms of citizenship (see Figure 11), we see that there are no significant differences in terms of those who consider citizenship policy to be a danger. Russian citizens, however, consider reduction in the relative importance of Russian to be less of a danger (35%).




Figure 11: Relative proportion of Estonian Russians who consider Estonian citizenship policy and reduction in the use of Russian in social interaction dangerous in terms of citizenship and knowledge of Estonian

The ability to communicate in Estonian is also not associated with the definition of dangers. Those with “average” knowledge of Estonian and those who “do not understand it at all” consider citizenship policy to be the greatest danger. Those non-Estonians, however, who can communicate “a little” in Estonian are worried most about possible reduction in the relative importance of the Russian language.

Younger (19-29 year old) non-Estonians consider Estonian citizenship policy to endanger the future of Estonian Russians to a lesser degree (see Figure 12). Results concerning the relative importance of Russian, however, fluctuate in terms of age. In terms of education, Estonian Russians with secondary education consider their future endangered more by citizenship policy and reduction in the use of Russian (see Figure 13).




Figure 12: Relative proportion in terms of age of non-Estonians who consider Estonian citizenship policy and reduction in the use of Russian in social interaction to be dangerous




Figure 13: Relative proportion in terms of education of non-Estonians who consider Estonian citizenship policy and reduction in the use of Russian in social interaction to be dangerous

There are no significant regional differences in evaluating the danger presented by citizenship policy. Estonian Russians from Eastern Viru County consider reduction in the use of Russian to be somewhat less dangerous (38%). There are also no differences in the sense of danger of non-Estonians in terms of their economic situation.

In summary, it can be said that non-Estonians also think on the one hand of the situation in their nearest living environment in evaluating dangers (there is no great danger in Eastern Viru County of reduction in the relative importance of Russian in social interaction), on the other hand, however, of the situation of Estonian Russians more generally (there are also respondents among Estonian citizens who consider citizenship policy to be dangerous). The emergence of dangers associated with integration at a high level on the background of other dangers indicates that the problems of citizenship and the Russian language are indeed also existential questions for a large portion of Estonian Russians. The fact that citizenship policy seems more dangerous to the greater portion of non-Estonians than weakening of national identity and national culture indicates that citizenship is in addition to collective interests also an important individual interest for achieving a sense of security and a defined position in Estonian society. Correlations also indicate that the concern of Estonian Russians over reduction in the use of Russian, but not over citizenship policy, is associated with national identity.

3. Attitudes and Activities of Estonians Express Distancing

We have turned our attention to the consistently high degree of disturbance and attitude of rejection of Estonians toward non-Estonians for years in our integration studies. Data from the monitoring study of 2002 aroused hope for improvement, but according to the results of the study of 2005, the indicators have again risen to former levels and in places even higher (see Appendix Tables 2-5). The relative proportion of Estonians who consider the lifestyle and way of thinking of Russians to be different from their own has risen by 18% over the past three years (from 60% in 2002 to 78% in 2005). An increase of the same proportion is characteristic of all age groups, including young people up to 19 years of age and in the 20-29 age group (see Appendix Table 1).

During the same time interval, the number of Estonians disturbed by the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Russians has also risen in all age groups (see Appendix Table 2). Yet as indicated by data from the same table, something of a decline in the feeling of disturbance has nevertheless taken place compared to 1996, and the data from 2002 may perhaps depict an “anomaly” rather than a trend. The percentages presented in parentheses in the first column of the table refer to the fact that the general level of sense of disturbance among Estonians on account of the behaviour and lifestyle of Russians is closer to average or low because those who are “very disturbed” number consistently few in terms of age groups (10-13%). The small number of people who feel very disturbed confirms the result obtained through other questions, according to which most Estonians do not consider Russians in Estonia to be dangerous to their own future. Regardless of the low intensity of the feeling of disturbance, the recommended trend in development of ethnic relations in the context of integration is nevertheless the gradual reduction in the number of people who feel disturbed by it.

The relative proportion of respondents who would not accept employment or attend school in an environment with a large number of Russians (or would do so only out of extreme necessity) demonstrates the attitude of rejection held by Estonians in relation to non-Estonians (see Appendix Table 3). Summarily there are now 10% fewer (37%) people with this attitude compared to 1997. The fact that this reduction has taken place primarily due to older Estonians (over 50 years old), whose attitude has become less rejective, possibly due to growing unemployment, is cause for concern. At the same time, the attitude of rejection has not decreased among those aged 20-29, and it has altogether increased by 9% among those aged 15-19. The data of the monitoring study of 2000 are the “anomaly” in this table, as they indicate a lower relative proportion of attitudes of rejection among young people as well, yet they unfortunately remain different from the general trend.

The number of Estonians who work in working environments where there are very few non-Estonians or none at all also has not decreased (see Appendix Table 4), and there are now more who do so among young people up to 29 years of age (87%) compared to 2002. Examining the data in more detail, the relative proportion of young Estonians who work in working environments with no non-Estonians at all has indeed decreased a little over the past three years, yet the number of those who have only a few Russian co-workers has increased accordingly even more. The working environment is one of the most important places for learning another language and for

adapting to a different cultural background. According to data from the study of 2005, over half of young Russians (up to 29 years of age) work in an environment where there are only a few Estonian co-workers or none at all. The unwillingness of Estonians to accept employment in a Russian working environment or to accept Russian co-workers is not to the benefit of the knowledge of Estonian of Estonian Russians. Nevertheless, ignorance of the Estonian language in particular, as we will see below, is one of the essential factors about Russians that disturbs Estonians. Russian incompetence in the Estonian language disturbs most Estonians (80%), including one third of Estonians who are very disturbed by this (see Appendix Table 5). Furthermore, the feeling of disturbance among young Estonians is even a few percentage points higher. These figures have remained relatively stable since 1996.

While the attitude of rejection of the older generation of Estonians is perhaps partially explainable by the injustice they experienced during the soviet era, the reason for distancing in the case of young people may lie in limited social interaction with young Russians. A certain knowledge of Russian may prove to be necessary to initiate social interaction with Russians. Unilingualism of both sides does not foster the establishment of contacts or the emergence of relationships. Ignorance of Russian also partially causes unwillingness to accept jobs in Russian working environments, which was mentioned above.

The data in Table 6 of the Appendix indicates that while the knowledge of Russian among 30 year old and older Estonians has remained at more or less the same level in terms of age groups, the knowledge of Russian among young people up to 29 years of age has decreased by 20% compared to 1997. Only a quarter of young Estonians up to 19 years of age and half of those 20-29 years of age are capable nowadays of functionally interacting socially in Russian. In comparison, it can be said that the opposite is true in terms of the knowledge of Estonian of young Russians, 20% more young people up to 29 years of age are now capable of properly interacting socially in Estonian than in 1997 (see Appendix Table 7). Nevertheless, there are another 30-40% of young Russians who are unable to interact socially in Estonian. When interacting socially with them, one would need knowledge of Russian.

The data presented above makes it possible to pose a hypothesis that Estonian young people with little knowledge of Russian are more apt to reject Russians and are more disturbed by their different kind of way of life. Figure 14 illustrates that this hypothesis is confirmed by data from the study (IM 2005):




Figure 14: Knowledge of Russian and attitudes relating to Russians among Estonian young people of various ages

When knowledge of Russian improves with increasing age, indicators of disturbance and rejection decrease: while 44% of young Estonians up to 19 years of age would not want Russians among their closest associates, only 29% of Estonians 30-39 years old feel the same way.

The Figure 15 provides an even more graphic depiction of the association between knowledge of Russian and attitudes of rejection, where a decrease in the collective indicator of knowledge of Russian (combines comprehension of speech, ability to read, ability to communicate and ability to write) corresponds to an increase in the relative proportion of respondents who feel disturbed and whose attitude rejects non-Estonians. The aggregated indicator of language proficiency characterises not only the ability to communicate but also the ability to understand language and culture more generally.




Figure 15: Attitudes of young Estonians up to 29 years of age depending on knowledge of Russian

The fact that the difference in behaviour and lifestyle of Russians disturbs young Estonians with post-secondary education the most (78%) indicates that this is truly influenced by language proficiency and not by the overall level of education. Young people with elementary education follow at 63% and the most tolerant are young people with secondary education – only 56% feel disturbed.

The following table of evaluations provides an overview of the level at which Russian is taught in Estonian schools compared to the level at which Estonian is taught in Russian schools:

Table 4: Appraisals of the Level at Which Language is Taught in Estonian and Russian Schools (%)

	Russian in Estonian schools		Estonian in Russian schools	
	1997	2005	1997	2005
Language is not taught	20	8	5	-
Lessons are taught but the language is practically not mastered	16	33	20	8
Knowledge about the language is acquired but pupils do not learn to communicate	37	40	50	47
Good knowledge and ability to communicate are acquired	17	12	23	43
Difficult to say	10	11	3	2

Source: appraisals by pupils and their parents

At least two fifths of young Estonians either do not study Russian at all or do not master it in lessons at school. A similar number do not acquire the ability to communicate. At the same time, both knowledge and the ability to communicate in Estonian are acquired in Russian schools according to 43% of respondents.

Compared to appraisals from 1997, more Estonian schools have begun teaching Russian but the level of teaching has not improved. The level of teaching, however, has improved markedly in Russian schools particularly in terms of the addition of the ability to communicate to the knowledge of more pupils.

The need for proficiency in Russian has grown from year to year. While 43% of young employed Estonians up to 29 years of age replied in 2000 that they need Russian at work, 38% that they need English and 12% that they need Finnish, the corresponding numbers in 2005 were 65%, 32% and 10%. The relative proportion of young people who use Russian in their everyday work has increased by 20% in five years, while the number of those who use English and Finnish has decreased. Studies indicate that young Estonians have to compete ever more on the labour market with young Russians who are fluent in both Estonian and Russian. Estonians also no longer consider increasing relative importance of Russian in social interaction to be a factor that endangers the future of Estonians. A total of 79% of young Estonians up to 29 years of age consider the teaching of Russian to be necessary in Estonian schools, and 62% consider the teaching of Russian literature and culture to be important.

The rejection of another nationality can have two kinds of origin:

- 1) It can be associated with negative personal experiences from contacts with representatives of that nationality; for example, 79% of young Estonians who have more frequently observed conflicts between Estonians and non-Estonians in public places and near their homes feel disturbed by the difference in behaviour of Russians.
- 2) Derives from widespread notions, in other words social representations. Receptivity to negative prejudices is greater in the event of scant contacts with representatives of the other nationality.

Of the more than 2000 pupils of Estonian schools surveyed in the course of a study examining security and risk behaviour carried out among 8th grade pupils in schools in Tallinn during the 2002/2003 school year, 48% had pupils of other nationalities in their class, 31% came in contact with young people of other nationalities through sporting activities and 14% through hobbies, and one quarter of pupils has a partner from another nationality to interact with socially. Of the pupils surveyed, 8% had 3-4 of the four possibilities for contact listed, nearly a quarter had 2 of the possibilities, less than half had one of the possibilities and 23% of pupils did not have a single contact with a non-Estonian (see Table 5).

Table 5: Appraisals by Estonian Pupils of Relations Between Young Estonians and Russians Depending on the Number of Contacts with Non-Estonians (%)

Number of contacts with non-Estonians	0	1	2	3-4	Total
Hostility and picking quarrels	53	46	43	40	46
Apprehension and fear of one another	13	11	10	11	12
Do not interact socially, avoid one another	39	32	28	24	32
Get along satisfactorily at events and in extracurricular activities	21	34	39	57	34
Become friends with each other, spend free time together	8	16	24	35	18
Other	11	12	16	16	13
Number of pupils %	23	46	24	8	100

Source: Study of 8th grade pupils in Tallinn

The largest number of Estonian pupils felt that relations between Russian and Estonian pupils are characterised by hostility and picking quarrels (46%). One third of pupils found that young Estonians and Russians do not interact socially among themselves and avoid each other, and 12% observed mutual apprehension and fear in relations. On the positive side, one third of pupils indicated that young people get along satisfactorily at events and in extracurricular activities, and less than one fifth that young Estonians and Russians become friends with each other and spend free time together.

The data presented in the table indicates that the more young Estonians have contact with young people of other nationalities, the more positive and less negative their appraisals are of relations between themselves. The number of pupils that observed satisfactory relations at events and in extracurricular activities increased the most (from 21% to 57%) with the increase in the number of contacts. At the same time, existing contacts are not sufficient to significantly change the most typical notion widespread among young people of hostility between young Estonians and Russians (a decrease of only 13%). Social interaction in school, sports or extracurricular activities remains fleeting. Young Russians who participate in these areas are in the minority and try to behave like Estonians. Young Estonians interact little socially with young Russians in their free time.

Twin schools, joint sports competitions and cultural events for young Estonians and non-Estonians would not at all be superfluous alongside ethnically oriented education in contemporary Estonian schools. We live in a globalising world where we inevitably have to get used to interacting socially with people of very different cultural backgrounds. The more so that according to the study, the attitude of young Estonians toward representatives of other nationalities and races could be better: only 30% of young Estonians up to 29 years of age did not name any representatives of the five peoples/races (excluding Russians) who they would not like to see as their close associates. A total of 30% named 1-3 representatives of the five peoples/races as undesirable, 20% named four and 19% named all five.




Figure 16: Attitude of rejection regarding Russians as close associates of young Estonians up to 29 years of age depending on attitude toward other peoples (%)

Figure 16 shows that the attitude of rejection regarding Russians is associated with more general manifestations of xenophobia in the case of young people as well: young people who would not reject representatives of any of the peoples as their close associates (excluding Russians) also have very few attitudes of rejection towards Russians. On the other hand, those young people who tended to reject representatives of all five other peoples mostly also rejected Russians.

The knowledge of the Russian language and familiarity with Russian culture and lifestyle are important as cultural capital for young Estonians which will be needed for years to come both living and working in Estonia as well as in developing economic or cultural contacts with Russia. This capital cannot be acquired through school lessons alone. Rather, this requires more frequent social interaction with young Russians than is presently the case. Since contact with young Estonians is beneficial in every way for young Russians as well, because in the course of social interaction they can gradually switch over to speaking in Estonian, educational institutions and youth organisations should foster development of this kind of social interaction as much as possible.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Relative Proportion of Estonians Who Consider the Lifestyle and Way of Thinking of Russians to be Different From Their Own (%) in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
2002	60	56	64	65	53	62	61
2005	78	74	82	73	77	81	81

Table 2: Relative Proportion of Estonians Who Feel Disturbed by the Different Behaviour and Lifestyle of Russians (%) in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
1996*	66 (13)	68	69	65	64	64	67
2002	46 (11)	52	50	49	44	52	37
2005	59 (10)	66	60	51	62	64	57

* the wording was “different way of thinking and behaviour”

** those who feel “very disturbed” are indicated in parentheses

Table 3: Relative Proportion of Estonians (%) Who Would Not Go to Work or School in an Environment Where There are Many Russians in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
1997	48	49	42	38	52	45	60

2000	41	36	34	29	37	46	60
2002	44	50	42	34	35	44	56
2005	37	59	42	33	35	29	32

Table 4: Relative Proportion of Employed Estonians (%) With Few Non-Estonians or None At All Among Their Closer Co-workers in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
2002 few	35	41	35	26	37	40
2002 none	49	38	51	63	43	41
2002 total	84	79	86	89	80	81
2005 few	45	53	42	47	39	41
2005 none	41	34	45	41	41	54
2005 total	86	87	87	88	80	95

Table 5: Relative Proportion of Estonians Who Feel Disturbed by the Deficiency in Proficiency in Estonian of Russians (%) in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
1996	81 (33)	81	84	80	78	79	82
2002	75 (35)	86	88	78	69	68	68
2005	80 (34)	83	82	81	84	80	74

* those who feel “very disturbed” are indicated in parentheses

Table 6: Relative Proportion of Estonians Able to Interact “Well” or “Average” in Russian (%) in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
1997	75	44	75	83	88	89	65
2000	76	42	75	87	91	81	72
2002	75	36	69	90	82	85	70
2005	71	24	54	84	87	82	77

Table 7: Relative Proportion of Non-Estonians Able to Interact “Well” or “Average” in Estonian (%) in Terms of Age From the Surveys of Different Years

Age	All	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
1997	41	42	50	46	40	32	30
2000	44	67	52	36	48	38	32
2002	45	58	59	47	43	44	31
2005	41	63	70	39	36	38	13*

Citizenship and Political Inclusion

Klara Hallik

In most general terms, citizenship signifies the fact that an individual belongs to a given society, the official recognition of this fact and the identification of the individual with this society. From the standpoint of individual identity, citizenship is the most universal and at the same time also the most abstract way of identifying collectively, which does not exclude but rather takes for granted plural identities. Theoretically, distinctions are made between the meanings of so-called 'shallow' and 'deep' citizenship. The first case is a model of relations between the state and the individual, where the state guarantees a stable social and political environment and the individual fulfils minimal obligations to the state, is law-abiding, pays taxes and serves in the defence forces, if this kind of obligation is prescribed by law. These kinds of relations are predominantly reduced to the legal content of citizenship. The second meaning of citizenship includes relations between the state and the individual that are more many-sided and based on mutual dependence and bilateral balance between rights and duties, and they are the prerequisite for the many-sided functioning of a person as a social being. So-called social and cultural 'citizenship' and the identification of a person with the given society are equivalently added to the legal content of citizenship. Citizenship is in this sense the normal state of the entire social life of an individual. It is the "right to rights" and to equal treatment in the entire public sphere.

In this chapter, data from the integration monitoring study is analysed using two approaches:

1. the identification of Estonian Russians with Estonia associated with citizenship
2. through political inclusion in the media, political interest and political participation

1. Evaluation of Citizenship Policy and Identification with Estonia

1.1 Evaluation of Citizenship Policy and Expansion of the Citizenry

The objective of political integration is the equal inclusion of all important social groups, including ethnic groups, in public life. The actual practical question of Estonian citizenship policy is reduced (prior to presumable immigration) to how to make the factual permanent population correspond more with its formal-legal membership in terms of citizenship. The situation where there is a permanent numerous segment of the population consisting of stateless individuals and Russian citizens in the country leads to the erosion of the institution of citizenship. Some citizens have full rights while the rights of others are limited to the opportunity to elect 'full citizens' to the local government, still others have in addition to that the right to have a say in the politics of a neighbouring country. In other words, this is the segmented double citizenship of this group (consisting primarily of Russian citizens).

According to preceding studies and the present study, Estonians and Russians evaluate the citizenship policy of the country differently (see Appendix Table 1):

- 1) 60% of Estonians consider it normal and in accordance with international standards (compared to 47% in 1994);

2) The most important change in the attitudes of Estonians over the past 10 years is the perceptible decrease in the relative proportion of those who consider citizenship policy to be lenient and damaging to Estonia's national interests (36% in 1994, 17% in 2005). This displacement in appraisals indicates on the one hand the increased sense of security of Estonians and a decrease in the "Russian danger", yet also partially reflects the fact that the problem of citizenship has not been widely discussed recently in public political life. It is somewhat surprising that Estonians with post-secondary education accept the present policy more than respondents with elementary and secondary education (55% of respondents with elementary education, 63% with secondary education and 67% with post-secondary education consider it to be appropriate). There are also more people among Estonians with post-secondary education who still see citizenship policy as dangerous for Estonians as a people (14% with elementary education, 17% with secondary education and 20% with post-secondary education). Admittedly, one fourth of respondents with elementary education are incapable of evaluating citizenship policy.

3) Most Russians (70%) continue to consider citizenship policy too strict and believe that it violates the human rights of non-Estonians, while 22% consider it to be normal and in accordance with international standards. Young non-Estonians (15 – 29) share this general appraisal, which differs from the average only to a small degree. Appraisals, however, depend somewhat more on how 'far' one is from Estonian citizenship. One third of Estonian citizens, less than one fourth of stateless individuals and only one tenth of Russian citizens consider the policy to be satisfactory and in accordance with international standards.

One of the priorities of the integration programme is the rapid naturalisation of stateless people. The resolution of this problem fundamentally depends on two factors – the activeness of people themselves and whether the capability of potential applicants to overcome the language barrier is accounted for in naturalisation procedures.

Stateless individuals were represented by 102 people in the overall random sample of our study and by 103 people in the combined random sample of young non-Estonians 15-29 years of age. Only 16% of the stateless individuals surveyed in the overall random sample and 43% of those in the random sample of young people answered the question of whether the respondent intends to apply for Estonian citizenship within the next year affirmatively (58% and 33% respectively responded negatively). A quarter of both groups have not yet decided whether or not to apply for citizenship in the near future. This result also adequately reflects the actual naturalisation process. On the one hand, they want to become Estonian citizens (75% of stateless respondents, 73% of the spouses of respondents without Estonian citizenship and 92% of children), yet in practice they do not achieve it for many reasons, primarily because of not knowing Estonian. The present study also confirms this conclusion. All who plan to apply for citizenship during the upcoming year have mastered Estonian, 60% of them well or satisfactorily.

Conversely, 70% of those who do not plan to apply for citizenship during the coming year either do not know the language at all or have a minimal understanding of it. At the same time, the language barrier is not a separate indicator that is completely independent of other factors. Young people who do not know Estonian are associated with below average education and mostly also with a less favourable social position as a whole. Even if the state contributes to programmes for teaching them Estonian, the chances of these people passing the constitution and citizenship law exam and the Estonian language exam remain slim. As a

result, this group accumulates ever more traits characteristic of social risk groups in the future.

In all monitoring studies, the attitude of Estonians toward the possible resolution of the citizenship problem was also tested by way of the question, “Which groups of non-Estonians could be given Estonian citizenship under more simplified terms?” There is reason to consider this question an essential indicator of the current public attitude in Estonia toward non-citizens and other local nationalities, demonstrating whether they are accepted as full members of society or not. Respondents were categorised according to the number of criteria (that is how many groups) they are willing to allow citizenship ‘under simplified terms’ and the data from the survey was grouped on this basis.

Types: *10% are not willing to make concessions to anybody* (above average in Tallinn, 15%), among those with poor command of the Russian language (16%) and among Estonians with post-secondary education (14%); *31% - on the basis of one criterion* (no difference in terms of demographic indicators with the exception of those with poor command of Russian, 25%); *26% - on the basis of two criteria* (small difference with the exception of those with post-secondary education – 21%, and the oldest group); *26% - on the basis of 3-7 criteria* (difference only in the level of proficiency in Russian, 36% of those fluent in Russian are supportive, 17% of those with poor command of the language); nearly 8% of the respondents have no opinion.

Changes that have taken place in the opinion of Estonians:

1. **first** – exclusive attitudes concerning citizenship have weakened; while one fifth of Estonians (18%) were not willing to make any concessions to anybody in 2000, less than one tenth held this position in 2005; it is characteristic that the attitudes of different groups of Estonians have converged toward one another;

Table 1: Attitude of Estonians Toward Granting Citizenship Under Simplified Terms 2000 – 2005 (%)

Which of the following groups of non-Estonians could in your opinion be granted Estonian citizenship under simplified terms (more lenient language proficiency standards)?	2000	2005
People born in Estonia	36	53
Families of citizens by birth	39	39
Family members of all Estonian citizens	28	25
Retired persons	17	14
All young people on their 16 th birthday	8	7
People with permanent residence permits	7	5
Nobody	18	10
Total respondents	633	667

* Since each respondent was allowed to give more than one response, the sum of percentages may be greater than 100

2. **secondly** – the attitude towards the question of granting citizenship to people born in Estonia has undergone the greatest change; nowadays over half of Estonians would support granting citizenship to this group. This circumstance is fundamentally

significant – it is an indicator of the weakening of the ethnic-cultural burden of the concept of citizenship.




Figure 1: Attitude of Estonians toward granting citizenship under simplified terms to people born in Estonia 2000 – 2005 (%)

3. **Thirdly**, based on data from the survey, it can be concluded that for Estonian Russians, being in favour of or opposed to making citizenship more open and inclusive depends more on general ethnic attitudes than the interests of certain social groups. It can be expected that those who favour teaching the languages and cultures of local minorities in schools are somewhat more open to the acquisition of citizenship on the principle of territory. Appraisal of integration taking place in one's home neighbourhood (city, rural municipality) as unsuccessful, or the absence of a firm position appears to dispose respondents somewhat more in favour of granting citizenship on the basis of territory. Generally speaking, attitudes are not radically different, which allows us to contend that a departure from a community-based and ethnocentric version has begun for Estonians in the understanding of citizenship.

1.2 Citizenship and Belonging

The legal content of citizenship determines the official belonging of an individual to a country and society. The social dimension of citizenship is reflected in the degree and ways of participation in common benefits at the disposal of a given society, and its cultural content is expressed by participation in social culture and in the collective identity, identification in one way or another with the given society or nationality. On an empirical level, the meaning of citizenship in the ordinary understandings of people lies nearest to the concept of one's 'homeland'. In the conditions of Estonia, and the present study also confirms this, 'normal' citizenship and belonging to one's homeland do not overlap, due both to the compulsion of historical circumstances, since about half of the non-Estonians were born outside of Estonia, as well as the fact that the institution of citizenship itself is plural. Our task was to determine


what kind of cumulative effect these two factors that marginalise the collective identity and sense of homeland of non-Estonians have on Estonian identity.

Table 2: Collective Identification of Estonian Russians With... (%)

	... Estonian citizens	... Estonian Russians	... Russians of Russia
Yes	61	63	19
No	36	34	77
Difficult to say	3	3	4
Total	100	100	100
	334	334	334
Estonian Russians 15 – 29 years of age			
Yes	68	65	12
No	30	34	87
Difficult to say	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100
	279	279	279


* Responses to the question: “Which group do you consider yourself to belong to?”

Estonian citizenship is not merely a formal category in the estimation of non-Estonians; it is an important channel for collective identification, an element of Estonia’s collective identity.




* Responses to the question: “Which group do you consider yourself to belong to?”

Figure 2: Ethnic identification of Estonian Russians in terms of citizenship (%)



* Responses to the question: “Which country do you consider to be your homeland?”

Figure 3: Estonia and Russia as a homeland. In terms of age groups (%)



* Responses to the question: “Which country do you consider to be your homeland?”

Figure 4: Estonia and Russia as a homeland. In terms of regions (%)

Commentary:

- the level of civil integration expressed in the collective identity of Estonian Russians is considerably high and tends to increase in younger age groups, whereas the identity of ‘two homelands’ is also weakening in these groups;
- half of non-Estonians consider Estonia to be their homeland; if we add to this the sense of a dual homeland, the corresponding relative proportion is 70%.
- Estonian citizens and stateless non-Estonians equally consider Estonia to be their homeland; young citizens and stateless young people also do not differ in their appraisals of their homeland, whereas 2/3 of both groups consider Estonia to be their homeland (together with the dual appraisal entirely 87%); the exception is Russian

citizens, of whom more than half consider Russia to be their homeland; yet in the case of the appraisal of a dual homeland, half of Russian citizens also consider Estonia to be their homeland. Thus young Russian citizens do not appear to connect their legal citizenship with Russia as their homeland.

2. Political Inclusion: Media Usage, Political Interest and Political Participation

2.1 Media Fields. The Use of Estonian- and Russian-language Media Channels

Media studies in Estonia have indicated that the media spaces of Estonians and the Russian-language population differ very strongly, as a result of which the everyday life of the two communities takes place in different socio-cultural environments. The Estonian media fills the role of creator and guardian of uniform national social and cultural coordinates to a considerable degree due to the greater homogeneousness of Estonia's media auditorium, while at the same time being open to international sources. According to data from a University of Tartu research team (The Resident of Estonia at the Beginning of the 21st Century), the media space of Estonian Russians is in contrast to that of Estonians more pronouncedly differentiated on the basis of age groups and levels of education, and regional and social status, also due to the different relative proportion of Russian and Estonian sources. Results of studies examining media use of Estonian Russians appear to refer to the fact that at least in the sphere of media use, there is no longer reason to speak of an undivided Russian-language sub-society. On the level of the entire society, this situation should weaken the rigid division into 'two societies' of a decade ago. At the same time, the poor capability of Estonia's Russian-language media to function as the information channel and integrator for the Russian community fosters the continuing marginalisation of this part of society.

In the context of integration, two main tasks have been set in the present study: first – to find out how large a part of Estonian and Russian media consumers cross the boundary of the media field of their own language, and secondly – in what kind of relationship are media channels of Estonian and Russian origin used.

The overall high level of media use is characteristic of contemporary Estonia as a media society, where the reading of newspapers and the following of television and radio broadcasts are no longer one way of consuming culture, but rather the general background for social life that the absolute majority of members of society participates in. Data that characterises the extent of use of different media channels according to our study are provided in Appendix Table 2. Television occupies the leading position among media channels for both Estonian and Russian audiences, followed by radio and the printed press. For many reasons, the Russian-language media consumer reads fewer publications than Estonians. This difference cannot be explained *a priori* by the differences in cultural background of media consumers but rather by the marginality of local Russian-language publications, which in turn derives from the choice of subjects originating from different sources (the abundance of reprints of Estonian language press and that from Russia), commercialisation, but also from limited access to quality journalism from Russia.

General data from the monitoring study indicates that 30% of non-Estonians tune in to Estonian-language television and radio channels regularly (that is every day or a few times per week), 69% tune in to Russian-language broadcasts on Estonian television and radio stations, and practically all Estonian Russians tune in to Russian television channels. The first conclusion from this general picture is that all Estonian Russians use media sources of both

Estonian and Russian origin in one way or another. This empirical truth does not indeed provide an answer to the question of what information is obtained from either source (this is possible through media-based in-depth studies), yet it is clear that Russia’s television network compensates for the lack of an entirely Russian-language television channel in Estonia, satisfying the need for highbrow culture, entertainment and broader information. The information environment of Russian origin will inevitably remain a factor in shaping the mentality and identity of local Russians in the future as well. The expansion of the Estonian-language niche will help to prevent its one-sided domination. Several factors influence entry into the Estonian-centred media space, and the most effective of them is mastery of the Estonian language.

Use of Estonian-language Media Channels

As a result of grouping Russian-language respondents in terms of different media channels, we obtained 3 types of users of Estonian-language media: 1) users of all channels (TV, radio, print media) – 40%, 2) exclusively TV viewers – 15%, and 3) do not use Estonian-language media channels at all – 40%. (13 respondents, who claimed to exclusively read the Estonian-language press, are left out of further analysis).




Figure 5: Use of Estonian-language media depending on the level of proficiency in Estonian (%)

Varying access to Estonian-language media in terms of citizenship also depends on varying levels of proficiency in Estonian, which is perceptible from the data of the general distribution as well as of the analysis of the individual level. Every other Estonian Russian citizen, every fifth stateless individual, and every tenth Russian citizen regularly uses Estonian-language television and radio. The use of print media also correlates clearly with differing linguistic competence and is reflected in this way through the differentiation of media use in terms of citizenship. It appears from the following data (see Figure 6) that there are particularly large differences in the level of consumption of several media sources together when viewed in terms of different citizenships. Also, every fourth or fifth Estonian citizen does not pay attention to Estonian-language media at all.




Figure 6: Use of Estonian-language media depending on citizenship of Estonian Russians (%)

The potential for using Estonian-language media by different age groups differs by over three times, whereas at least one fifth of young people do not use Estonian-language sources of information.

In summary, the present study indicates that the use/non-use of Estonian-language media by Estonian Russians bears the *nature of status* to a certain extent due to the preservation of the language barrier. People who use several channels together regularly are:

- among Estonian citizens (60%), among stateless individuals – 30%, among Russian citizens – 20%;
- among respondents with post-secondary education – 56%, with secondary and elementary education – 39% and 36% respectively;
- regional differences are to the detriment of Eastern Viru County, where other social-cultural conditions are also worse in comparison with other regions (active users less than one quarter);
- 70% of the highest income bracket (over 4000 kroons per family member) use Estonian-language media sources together and regularly, compared to one quarter of respondents in the lowest income bracket (up to 2500 kroons).

An important conclusion in light of the results referenced above is that Estonia will also continue to need a varied Russian-language media culture and channels oriented to different groups for society to function as a *uniform field of information*. It turns out that nearly 90% of those who are not at all in contact with Estonian-language media regularly listen to Estonian radio Russian-language broadcasts and 56% read local Russian-language newspapers and magazines. The use of Estonian-language media does not eliminate Russian-language media – according to our study, nearly 70% of those who regularly use Estonian-

language media also regularly read Russian-language newspapers, the remainder do so less frequently.

Use of Russian-language Media by Estonians

The Russian-language media in Estonia finds a portion of its audience among Estonians. According to our study, 26% of respondents watch Russian television programmes, and in addition to them, 30% of respondents marked that they occasionally watch/listen to Russian-language broadcasts. These are presumably some popular Russian-language programmes on Estonian channels. Middle aged people fluent in Russian watch Russian-language programmes slightly more than average, while 15-24 year old Estonians do so less than average. A total of 90% of Estonians do not pay any attention at all to the local Russian-language printed press and radio stations. Thus there are grounds for concluding that *how well Estonian society is informed of the life and problems of their Russian fellow citizens depends almost entirely on how the Estonian-language media reflects them.*

The consumption of media by Estonians and Russians differs fundamentally in terms of contact with the media world of Russia, that nearly one fifth of Estonians follows regularly (one third together with those who rarely use it).

Table 3: Use of Russian-language Media Sources by Estonians (%)

		Media sources that are listened to, watched or read		
		Estonian Russian-language media channels	Media channels in Russia	Total respondents
Age groups	15-24 years	45	29	137
	25-39 years	61	41	170
	40-54 years	61	39	170
	55-74 years	54	31	189
Level of education	Elementary	48	29	225
	Secondary	59	38	320
	Post-secondary	61	40	121
Region	Tallinn	56	44	149
	Eastern Viru County	63	83	30
	Remainder of Estonia	56	29	487

The role of traditional media will most likely remain an influence on Estonia's integration process in the near future as well. Alongside this, the use of the internet is increasing explosively. The first to transfer from consuming traditional media to the internet are young people. The influence of this change on relationships between nationalities and integration are thus far unknown.

2.2 Political Interest: Local and International Inclusion

Previous monitoring studies indicated a critical attitude toward politics in Estonian society and very modest desire to participate in it. At the same time, society as a whole is characterised by an extensive interest in political developments on the national as well as regional and global scales. The present monitoring study also indicates that three quarters of

Estonia's population use varied political information, including those who are interested in everything at home and abroad (12%), or at least selectively in the more important political events in Estonia and elsewhere in the world (64%). There are only 4% of those who are not at all interested in political events.




Figure 7: Interest of Estonians and Estonian Russians in political events in Estonia and elsewhere (%)

The level of overall interest in politics does not differ to any significant degree from nationality to nationality. Young people of both nationalities are also interested in political developments at very nearly the same level. The interest felt by Estonians and Russians toward Russian politics, though, differs.




Figure 8: Geographic trend of the political interests of young people (15-29 years old) (%)

The differentiation of the political interest of Estonians and Russians comes to light more markedly if we take into account the intensiveness of interest, in other words whether there is interest toward everything or only isolated events and facts. The fact mentioned above that Estonians and Estonian Russians live in ‘different media worlds’ is confirmed by the example of political interest as well. While 53% of Estonians are interested in almost all political events in Estonia, the proportion among Estonian Russians is 44%. Differences in political interest toward political events in Russia are even greater in terms of nationality: only 14% of Estonians are interested in almost all of what takes place in Russian politics, while this proportion of Estonian Russians is 42% (see Figure 9).




Figure 9: Interest of Estonians and Estonian Russians in political events in Estonia, Russia, the EU and the rest of the world (%)

Ethnic preferences concerning political information become more clearly evident when we take into account those in particular who are consistently interested, in other words those who follow almost all political news. These differences are displayed in the preceding figure (see Figure 9). This figure also demonstrates that the intensity of interest varies geographically and decreases as the distance from “home” increases.

That which is taking place in both Estonia and Russia is simultaneously in the sphere of interest of most Estonian Russians. A total of 35% of Estonian Russians are interested in almost everything in both Estonian and Russian politics, and 43% are selectively interested in the political events of both countries. The interest of young Estonians and Russians in politics is below average, but differences in terms of nationality correspond to the general pattern. While 35% of young Estonians 15-29 years of age are interested in almost everything in Estonian politics, 27% of young Russians share this interest. Yet only 5% of young Estonians are interested in almost everything in Russian politics, while 24% of Estonian Russians share this interest.

The differing trend of interests of Estonians and Estonian Russians creates problems in the context of political integration, while at the same time demonstrating the necessity of political dialogue between sectors of society with Estonian and Russian backgrounds.

2.3 Experience of Participation in Politics

The inclusion of citizens in public life presumes their participation in the political process in one way or another. In the present study, we measured political inclusion through the use of seven attributes, beginning with participation in elections through to the discussion of political problems in one's own circle of associates. We asked respondents to describe their participation in activities of a political nature over the past three years. This time interval was selected with the consideration that it would include the latest local municipal council elections (2002), in which non-citizens also have an active right to vote. The fact that it is popular in Estonian society to be interested in politics was once again confirmed. It has altogether been "privatised", as evidenced by the circumstance that over half (53%) of Estonians and Russians discuss politics on an 'unofficial' level within their own circle of associates. Unfortunately, interest in politics does not find practical expression in the form of actual participation in the political process. The fact that non-citizens do not participate at the general level of political participation, nationwide elections, influences general data the most. Regardless of this, the data confirms that young people up to 24 years of age are included in political life less than average.

In order to analyse political activity, we formed a collective index of five attributes (voting in elections, participation in political meetings, gathering signatures, drafting joint declarations for the press or official institutions, participation in demonstrations or strikes). Discussions on political themes and convincing others to vote for a particular candidate were not factored into this index because these activities do not have a direct outlet into the institutionalised sphere of public politics. Three groups of respondents were formed as an indicator of individual political inclusion: *Type 1*: those not included in politics who have not participated in any of the above-mentioned five activities at all over the past three years – 45%, *Type 2*: those who have participated in only one activity, or 'minimally included' – 41%, and *Type 3*: politically active group which has participated in 2–5 political activities – 14%. In terms of the ethnic/linguistic distribution of respondents, 38% of Estonians and 59% of Russians belong to the *first* category, 46% of Estonians and 32% of Russians to the *second* category and 15% of Estonians and 10% of Russians to the *third* category (see Tables 4 and 5). If we also add the political interest of the private sphere (discussions within one's circle of associates and convincing others to vote for a particular candidate), nearly *one fifth* of Estonians, *one fourth* of Russians with Estonian citizenship, and *two fifths* of stateless residents of Estonia, in other words even 13% more than citizens of Russia, distance themselves completely from politics according to the data from our study.

Table 4: Distribution of the Political Inclusion Index According to Citizenship (%)

Type of inclusion	Citizen / Estonian	Citizen / Estonian Russian	Stateless	Russian citizen	Total
Not included	38	35	77	81	45
Minimally included	47	48	22	10	41
Active	15	17	(...)	9	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100
	665	150	103	75	993

Table 5: Political Inclusion According to Nationality and Region (%)

Type of inclusion	Tallinn		Eastern Viru County		Remainder of Estonia	
	Estonians	Russians	Estonians	Russians	Estonians	Russians

Not included	35	66	23	57	41	46
Minimally included	50	26	64	33	44	40
Active	15	8	13	10	15	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	150	148	30	103	487	83


Conclusions from the data presented above are plainly obvious:

- the level of connection of Estonian *citizens* of different nationalities to political life is similar, to a great extent at the expense of the inclusion of non-Estonians living outside of Tallinn and Eastern Viru County;
- in comparing the relations between participants in the political process and those who are not included in terms of groups of nationalities, it becomes apparent that the relative proportion of polarised groups (active and outsiders) differs most in Tallinn; there are three times as many who are not politically included among Estonians than participants in politics, eight times as many among Russians, and in Eastern Viru County two and six times respectively; the *ethnic differentiation* of political participation is undoubtedly one source of imbalance in political development and of potential conflict;
- the group of people without citizenship has thus far been almost completely excluded from the political process; considering the fact that the other characteristics of the social position of this group (see the articles by Pavelson, Pettai and Proos in the present report) contain more than average risk factors, there is a real danger that this segment of the Russian community will evolve into the core of an ethnic lower class with the social instability and destructiveness characteristic of it (which is evidenced by its high level of unemployment, criminality and exclusion from stable social structures).

Civic Initiative: Unused Resource

The objective of this section of the study was to test potential willingness to participate in the political process and to find ethnic differences, if such differences should exist. We measured this as an evaluation of six possible ways to participate in politics on the scale of ‘important – not important’ (‘very important’, ‘quite important’, ‘not particularly important’, ‘not important at all’.)

The data provided indicates that the vision of Estonians and Russians, and of citizens and non-citizens of the primary ways of manifesting civic initiative coincide. There is also grounds to conclude that Estonians, who have greater chances to actually participate in political life and more experience, favour much more energetic political behaviour than Russians. The only exception is a lesser orientation to participating in demonstrations than Russians (see Figure 10).



* Responses to the question: “What could a resident of Estonia do to better contribute to the advancement of life in Estonia? How important is it in your opinion to...?”

Figure 10: Vision of Estonians and Estonian Russians concerning ways of expressing civic initiative (%)

Being informed of national policy and voting in elections is the background system for civic initiative, with which other ways of participation in political life combine (see Appendix Table 3). Potential types of civic initiative were formed on the basis of how many and what kinds of ways of civic participation respondents preferred: 1) well-rounded active type – 27%, 2) oriented to political participation through institutions – 17%, 3) those who favour free political initiative – 7%, 4) oriented to minimal inclusion, either only to being informed or participating in voting – 24%, 5) without clear preferences or ignorant of all possibilities – 25%. The distribution of these types is presented in the following figure. Differences in distribution of types according to citizenship are minimal, except for the markedly lower than average hope of stateless individuals (11%) to participate in politics through the mediation of parties and civic organisations, which reflects the experience of this group of not participating in political life.




Figure 11: Types of potential civic initiative (%)

2.4 Attitude Toward Including Non-Estonians in the Execution of Governmental Power

The attitude toward the participation of non-Estonians in public governmental institutions was tested in the monitoring studies of 2002 and 2005, and the results indicated that Estonians and non-Estonians have fundamentally different attitudes. The attitude of Estonians has remained the same as it was three years ago. There are nevertheless fewer people who rule out the participation of non-Estonians in the *Riigikogu* (Estonian Parliament, -5%), the government (-9%), and in the defence forces (-5%). The attitude in favour of so-called limited participation has correspondingly increased somewhat (see Appendix Table 4).

The notion held by Russians of their place in governmental power has undergone noticeable changes. The primary trend is the reduction in support for the demand for proportional representation (from 38% to 26%) as well as a decrease in support for the demand for liberal representation (independent of the number of non-Estonians, from 26% to 19%). In place of this, support for 'limited' representation has increased (from 7% to 19%). In the context of integration, it is possible to interpret these attitudes as the convergence of both communities towards each other, whereas Russians appear to adapt more rapidly to the model of division of power dominated by Estonians. The aim of Russians is to ensure guaranteed, though not completely equal participation in the execution of public governmental power. Future studies should reveal if this is a more lasting tendency or not.

In the course of further analysis of the data, four types of respondents have been formed: *liberal* – does not attach participation of non-Estonians in governmental power to their relative proportion among the population; those in favour of *proportional* inclusion – in favour of a relative proportion of one third; those in favour of *limited* inclusion – in favour of a relative proportion of 10 – 25%, and the *exclusive* type, who rules out the participation of non-Estonians completely from governing the country. More precise analysis of the information obtained indicates that there are few so called pure opinion types among Estonians. Attitudes diverge concerning different levels of governmental power as well as the proportions of inclusion. The overwhelming tendency is a combination where a favourable attitude in one branch of governmental power exists together with a limited or exclusive attitude in another. The distribution of types of attitude is summarised in the following table.

Table 6: Types of Respondents on the Basis of Attitude Toward the Participation of Non-Estonians in Governmental Power (%)

Type	In political power		In structures for national defence and security		In the boards of management of national enterprises		In all structures of government	
	E	V	E	V	E	V	E	V
Liberal	22	19	28	30	33	33	19	19
Liberal/proportional	0	4	0	2	-	-	0	6
Proportional	2	26	3	22	3	28	2	17
Limited	20	19	28	24	29	31	15	12
Limited/exclusive	19	1	9	4	-	-	20	3
Exclusive	10	0	9	1	15	1	5	0
Indecisive	14	25	9	11	-	-	28	38
No opinion	13	6	14	6	20	7	11	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* E – Estonians; V – Estonian Russians

In summary.

The present integration study provides grounds for concluding that the contribution of the Russian-speaking minority (denoted in our study by the term *Estonian Russians*) to the public political sphere remains marginal and far from equal and sufficient inclusion. The main reasons for this are unequal citizenship itself and the insufficient knowledge of the Estonian language. The general background of participation in public life is characterised by the fact that both Estonians and Estonian Russians prefer the role of the “minimal” citizen that is limited to being informed and participating in elections, or ignorance of politics altogether. At the same time, insufficient civic initiative and the lack of experience in participation in the political process fosters conformism (for example, attitudes of Estonians in the question of citizenship policy and the inclusion of minorities in political power) or negative attitudes toward the state and politics (for example, the appraisal by Russians of citizenship policy).

The data from the present monitoring study speak in favour of expanding citizenship as much as possible. This is the key for the further development of democracy and an increase in solidarity in society. The equal inclusion of minorities in public life and politics is supported by changes in identity and the singular association with Estonia as the homeland that have been considered in this section. Another important argument is that more and more Estonians support the more rapid granting of citizenship to non-citizens born in Estonia.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Appraisal of Citizenship Policy 1994 – 2005

Appraisal of citizenship policy	1994	1997	2000	2002	2005
Normal, corresponds to international standards					
- Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	47	52	56	61	61
-Non-Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	30	26	28	28	32
- stateless	10	3	12	10	18
- Russian citizen	4	3	6	16	9
Too strict towards non-Estonians, violates human rights					
- Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	7	11	6	7	7
-Non-Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	64	67	55	61	58
- stateless	86	89	79	84	77
- Russian citizen	64	67	80	77	83
Too lenient, harms the interests of the Estonian people					
- Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	36	24	21	21	17
-Non-Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	-	1	1	-	-
- stateless	-	-	<1	-	-
- Russian citizen	-	-	1,5	1	-
Undecided					
- Estonian citizen of	10	13	17	11	16

Republic of Estonia					
-Non-Estonian citizen of Republic of Estonia	6	6	16	9	10
- stateless	4	8	8	6	5
- Russian citizen	32	30	12	8	8

Source: Data from 1994, 1997 and 2000 in *Integratsioon Eesti ühiskonnas 2000* (Integration in Estonian Society 2000), pg. 33

Table 2: Use of Various Media Channels in Terms of Citizenship and Among Young People (%)

Channel/frequency of use		Entire random sample N=1000	Estonian / citizen	Estonian Russian / citizen	Estonian Russian / stateless	Estonian Russian / Russian citizen	15-29 years of age	
							Estonians	Estonian Russians
Estonian-language television and radio channels	Regularly*	76	99	47	22	10	98	37
	Rarely	9	(...)	28	24	25	(1)	28
	Never	15	(...)	25	54	65	(1)	35
Estonian-language newspapers/magazines	Regularly	68	93	31	11	3	95	22
	Rarely	13	6	33	27	17	3	37
	Never	19	1	36	62	80	2	41
Russian-language broadcasts on Estonian television and radio channels	Regularly	40	26	73	63	67	17	52
	Rarely	26	30	17	23	16	31	30
	Never	34	44	10	14	17	52	18
Russian-language Estonian radio stations	Regularly	32	4	85	90	90	6	85
	Rarely	9	9	10	7	5	8	13
	Never	59	87	5	3	5	86	2
Russian-language Estonian newspapers/magazines	Regularly	23	3	69	55	64	3	65
	Rarely	15	8	25	35	27	6	30
	Never	62	89	6	10	9	91	5
Television and radio channels from Russia	Regularly	43	19	95	90	95	13	93
	Rarely	12	16	2	8	5	19	6
	Never	45	65	3	2	...	68	1
Newspapers/magazines from Russia	Regularly	13	2	34	33	43	...	35
	Rarely	20	7	50	46	39	8	50
	Never	67	91	16	21	18	92	15
Internet	Regularly	43	41	61	45	16	68	76
	Rarely	10	10	6	13	5	11	11
	Never	47	49	33	42	79	21	13

* Daily users of the respective channels and those who do so a few times a week are counted as regular users of media.

Table 3: Distribution of Responses to the Question “...How important is it to...?”

	Entire random sample	Estonians	Estonian Russians		
			Citizen of Republic of Estonia	Stateless	Russian citizen
EVERYTHING IS UNIMPORTANT	13	11	15	12	22
To keep yourself up-to-date on Estonian politics and/or to vote in elections	24	24	26	27	21
IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ONLY keep yourself up-to-date with Estonian politics and/or to vote in elections	63	65	59	61	67
NAMELY IT IS IMPORTANT TO:					
To keep yourself up-to-date on Estonian politics and to vote in elections; IN ADDITION to participate in voluntary organisations or to be a member of some political party	17	18	16	11	13
To keep yourself up-to-date on Estonian politics and to vote in elections; IN ADDITION to participate in gathering signatures or in demonstrations	7	7	7	7	5
To keep yourself up-to-date on Estonian politics and to vote in elections; IN ADDITION to participate in voluntary organisations or to be a member of some political party; IN ADDITION to participate in gathering signatures or in demonstrations	27	28	24	23	28

Table 4: Distribution of Responses to the Question: “The relative proportion of non-Estonians in Estonia is one third of the population. How great do you think the relative proportion of non-Estonians should be in the following governmental institutions and offices?” (%)

	Estonians		Russians	
	2002 N=662	2005 N= 667	2002 N=342	2005 N= 334
In the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament)				
One third and more	5	3	51	38
One fourth	7	6	8	23
One tenth or less	36	35	5	7
None at all are needed	19	14	0	1
Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	25	28	27	24
Undecided	8	14	9	7
In the government				
One third and more	3	3	45	29
One fourth	5	3	8	28
One tenth or less	26	27	6	11
None at all are needed	33	24	1	1
Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	24	28	31	24
Undecided	9	15	9	7
In local government councils				
One third and more	4	3	48	43
One fourth	8	4	9	17
One tenth or less	28	24	3	9
None at all are needed	23	25	1	1
Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	28	28	31	24
Undecided	9	16	8	6
In the police force				
One third and more	7	4	36	29
One fourth	13	12	9	23
One tenth or less	28	26	5	8
None at all are needed	15	13	1	1
Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	28	31	43	33
Undecided	9	14	6	6
In the Defence Forces				
One third and more	8	5	31	24
One fourth	10	10	8	17
One tenth or less	23	23	6	11
None at all are needed	19	14	3	5
Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	30	32	43	34
Undecided	10	16	9	9
In managing boards of national enterprises				
One third and more	5	3	34	28
One fourth	7	4	8	23
One tenth or less	28	25	4	8
None at all are needed	19	15	1	1

Should not depend on the number of non-Estonians	29	33	44	33
Undecided	12	20	9	7

The Problem of Identity: Finding a Proper Balance Between the Unification of the Public Sphere and the Preservation of Differences in the Private Sphere

Raivo Vetik

1. Introduction

Analysis of the results of the Integration Monitoring 2005 indicates that the integration that has taken place thus far has not been as successful as we would hope. One of the serious signals is the fact that the level of proficiency in Estonian among Estonian Russians on the whole has not improved over the past eight years, remaining constant near the 40% level. A problem situation is developing in respect with the gymnasium reform of 2007, which is opposed by most Estonian Russians. The differing interpretation of the establishment of Soviet power in Estonia in 1940 (nearly half of Estonian Russians believe that this was a voluntary step) demonstrates that Estonians and Estonian Russians continue to live in very different mental worlds.

At the same time, the importance of the above-mentioned negative facts should not be overemphasised. It must be taken into account in the interpretation of the results of the monitoring study that integration is by its nature a conflicting process, because it simultaneously entails requirements for increasing the unity of society as a whole and the preservation of the cultural differences of minorities. The coexistence of processes moving in opposite directions inevitably leads to friction and even conflicts, which makes the progress of integration difficult and poses complicated problems for policymakers.

Generally speaking, the integration policy of Estonia as a country must resolve at least three types of contradictions. First is the contradiction between the need to have a common public sphere (questions of the legal status of people, effective communication between the state and the individual, support for democratic values etc.) and the wish of ethnic minorities to preserve their uniqueness. For example, the fixation of the status of the official language and the expansion of its field of use have been one essential objective in nation-building in Estonia, yet many Estonian Russians perceive this as the narrowing of their rights and as a danger to their identity.

The second type of contradictions is founded on the need to transform many social structures in Estonia. For example, the creation of an integral educational system requires the elimination of the two parallel school systems originating from the Soviet era. This is necessary for ensuring the coherence of society and for creating equal opportunities for young people to have successful careers. Standardised school education has historically been the primary instrument for the modernisation of most nation states and played an important role in increasing the equality of opportunities. Unfortunately, the attitude of many Estonian Russians toward reforming the school system is overwhelmingly negative, because the system from the Soviet era was culturally and psychologically more comfortable for them.

Finally, there is the contradiction between different visions in relation to the formation of Estonian statehood and its most general objectives, which are expressed, for example, by the attitude toward important historical events for Estonia, but also by the attitude toward Russia.

Russia embodies not only the injustice of the past, but also a continuing security danger for many Estonians. For most Russians, however, Russia is the source of their traditions and culture, and also the information space in which they continue to comprehend themselves.

The contradictions mentioned above are indeed typologically different, but a certain common deep-seated foundation unites them, a common social-psychological mechanism that is most precisely expressed by the concept 'national identity'. Identity is individual and collective differentiation and identification with other individuals, groups or phenomena, and as such, influences construction of reality by people. Identity is a fundamental phenomenon that runs through all of society. In this sense, it can be claimed that the different interpretation by Estonians and Estonian Russians of themselves and of society is a common denominator, on the basis of which very many further integration problems and different opinions arise. The basic question of integration policy is how to shape a common public sphere for all people who have attached themselves to Estonia in the kind of co-effect of different identities, and how to increase tolerance regarding cultural differences in the private sphere.

Problems in the relationships between the homogenization of society and the preservation of differences have been resolved in the national integration programme in the spirit of John Rex's theory of multiculturalism. According to John Rex, it must be discerned how united or different the main groups of nationalities of society are in both the public and private spheres and what kind of policy the state implements in them. Four logical possibilities arise from the analytical crosstabulation of the two differentiations mentioned above:

- a) policy that fosters unity in the public sphere but is tolerant in relation to differences in the private sphere;
- b) policy that fosters unity in the public sphere and does the same in the private sphere as well;
- c) policy that fosters difference and different rights in both the public and private spheres;
- d) Society that fosters difference and different rights in the public sphere, but similarity in the private sphere.

John Rex refers to version a) as the model of multicultural society and this has been adopted as the foundation of the integration programme for Estonian society. The theoretical model provided gives answers to many basic questions of integration policy. At the same time, the fact that some phenomena belong to both spheres remains a problem within this model. For example, education on the one hand gives people instrumental competence and in this sense belongs to the public sphere, yet on the other hand also teaches certain moral and spiritual values, that are characteristic of a certain type of identity and culture. The same goes for language – on the one hand, language is simply a means that is necessary for getting along in society and for normal communication between the citizen and the state, yet on the other hand, it is also the bearer of a certain spirituality and attitudes.

The national identity of the majority and minority groups are phenomena in which the conflict referred to is expressed in a particularly intense form. Identity is on the one hand a category that belongs to a very personal private sphere, yet on the other hand also a category of the public sphere generating trust and legitimacy. Based on the model of John Rex, it can be claimed that the aim of integration policy is on the one hand the convergence of the national identities of Estonians and Estonian Russians in aspects associated with the public sphere, which would guarantee the normal functioning of the Estonian state. On the other hand, the aim of integration policy is to help preserve the differences of minority groups in aspects of

identity associated with the private sphere, guaranteeing them cultural continuity and the sense of ethnic belonging that are important social resources for managing in society.

The theoretical discussion above demonstrated that although the private and public spheres can be differentiated analytically, they are nevertheless connected. Therefore the boundary between these spheres is not one-to-one, which makes the consideration of questions associated with identity very delicate. Taking the aspect of identity into account in overcoming friction associated with integration requires a specific approach that takes the peculiarities of each sphere or incident into account. In the following article, problems and phenomena of integration that are either directly or indirectly connected with the national identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians are analysed on the basis of data from the integration monitoring study. It is important to make note of the objectively conflicting basis of these problems and phenomena in evaluating them. In all these cases, the path to resolution cannot be the obtrusion of one side with the force, but rather in mutual adaptation and consideration.

2. Identity and the Educational System

Education is one of the most important spheres of the integration policy through which the dominant cultural model in society is reproduced and the identity of young people is shaped. In association with this, the formation of a unified Estonian educational system in place of two parallel systems that existed in the Soviet era is of utmost importance.

At the same time, it must be admitted on the basis of data from the integration monitoring study that the non-Estonian community is not sufficiently prepared for transition to the new system and the attitudes of people are predominantly sceptical. According to data from Figure 1 below, it can be seen that only around 20% of Estonian Russians are in favour of the kind of school where some subjects are taught in Estonian (meaning the planned new system). Nevertheless, the fact that even fewer people are in favour of preserving Russian-language schools in their present form is positive (this number less than one fifth). One tenth of respondents is in favour of exclusively Estonian schools, whereas it is associated with the level of education and regions. The lower the level of education, the greater the support for the kind of version which would essentially lead to the assimilation of young non-Estonians. The number of people in favour of exclusively Estonian language schools in Eastern Viru County is almost two times greater compared to other regions (up to 18%).




Figure 1: What kind of grammar school, secondary school would you like to attend, or would you like your children to attend?

The relatively stronger association of regions with lower levels of education and poorer economic development with the assimilation model refers to the phenomenon that is referred to in literature as ‘marginalisation’ and which is relatively widespread in immigration countries. Due to this kind of association, the favouring of this option cannot be considered positive in relation to advancing integration. The fact that most Estonian Russians (53%) see Russian-language schools with in-depth teaching of foreign languages as the ideal also cannot be considered positive since this attitude is essentially also a contradiction to the idea of educational reform.

Only one third of non-Estonians consider the decision to implement school reform to be good and believe that the ability of young non-Estonians to manage in Estonia will improve as a result. Over half, however, doubt this and fear that Russian-speaking young people could lose their identity as a result of this reform. In the case of this issue, essential regional differences can be noticed. It can be seen from the data in Figure 2 that the most critical are the non-Estonians of Tallinn, of whom over two thirds are against gymnasium reform. The number of people who feel this way in Eastern Viru County, though, is considerably smaller, remaining under 40%. While only 26% of respondents in Tallinn consider the decision to implement school reform to be good, this figure extends to 43% in Eastern Viru County. On the basis of the data in Figures 1 and 2, it can be claimed that compared to other regions of Estonia, the fear of Estonian Russians concerning losing their identity is weaker in Eastern Viru County as a predominantly Russian-language environment. To the extent that knowledge of Estonian among young people in Tallinn is clearly better compared to young people in Eastern Viru County, their greater scepticism cannot be associated with language proficiency. This is a case of a deeper identity problem, the analysis of which would require a separate study.




Figure 2: Attitude of Estonian Russians toward school reform in terms of regions (%)

At the same time, it should be noted that the fears of Estonian Russians in association with educational reform also derive from the weak preparation work done thus far by the government. Although there are only two years remaining before the beginning of the reform, which is hardly sufficient time, it has still not been decided in which subjects, in which order and with what kind of speed the transition to teaching in Estonian will take place. As a result, the retraining of teachers, the creation of new teaching materials and other preparatory activity have all also been postponed. Since people do not have enough information concerning reform, most Estonian Russians believe that the transition will take place throughout the gymnasium programme and all at once.

The above-mentioned results lead to the conclusion that preparations and explanatory work being carried out by the state in association with educational reform must be made more effective. To the extent that the educational system is one basic component of the public sphere of society, greater standardisation is urgently needed. At the same time, to the extent that education also is part of the private sphere, the target group should also be considered in the reform process. For example, the regional dimension of the changes being planned should be borne in mind. Since the situation in various regions of Estonia differs fundamentally, the implementation of different models of educational reform should be considered that in the final conclusion would definitely produce better results than a vigorous policy based on a single model.

3. Identity and the Preservation of Minority Cultures

The recognition of the multicultural nature of society and the preservation of the culture of ethnic minorities are the objectives of integration most directly associated with national identity. Their achievement depends on governmental policy and the attitudes of Estonians as well as the interest of Estonian Russians themselves in fostering their own language and culture. This sphere basically belongs to the private sphere, meaning that minorities have the right to organise matters associated with their cultural life themselves. At the same time, this sphere also contains a certain aspect of the public sphere – namely, the attitudes of Estonians

regarding minority cultures. One element of the public sphere is the support of democratic values, and tolerance regarding minority cultures is one of those values.

The data in Figure 3 illustrates the attitudes of Estonians toward the teaching of the Russian language, Russian literature and culture and the cultures and customs of other minority nationalities in Estonian-language schools. On the whole, it can be said that the attitudes of Estonians are overwhelmingly positive. The teaching of Russian, regarding which 87% of Estonians are positively disposed, is favoured the most in comparison with the three categories named. This is followed by the teaching of Russian literature and culture, yet over half of Estonians are also in favour of the teaching of the cultures and customs of other minority nationalities.




Figure 3: People in favour of teaching the cultures of other nationalities in Estonian-language schools in terms of age (%)

The data provided indicates that the number of people with a favourable attitude is somewhat smaller among the youngest and oldest age groups, compared to the intermediate age groups. The differences between age groups are not large, but the tendency is nevertheless apparent. This can be explained in the case of the 55-74 age group by the circumstance that the difficulties and hardships of the Soviet era affected their generation most painfully. In the case of the 15-24 age group, one of the reasons is undoubtedly the fact that knowledge of Russian is considerably worse among contemporary young people compared to older people. Since this is a phenomenon that among other things also influences the capability of young people to compete on the labour market, more attention should be paid to the relatively greater ethnic isolation of young people in Estonia.

The explanation of the relatively greater isolation of young people, based on their level of language proficiency, is also confirmed by the data provided in Figure 4, from which it appears that the given attitude is associated with education. The higher the level of education, the more respondents consider the teaching of other languages and cultures in Estonian schools necessary. This percentage extends over 90% in the case of people with post-secondary education. A total of 60% of respondents with elementary education and 80% with post-secondary education are in favour of teaching Russian literature and culture in Estonian

schools. Analysis indicates that an increase in income also influences the given attitudes in a positive direction.




Figure 4: People in favour of teaching the cultures of other nationalities in Estonian-language schools in terms of level of education (%)

The overwhelming support of Estonians for teaching the Russian language and culture creates a positive social background for fostering multiculturalism in society. Henceforth it is important to analyse to what extent non-Estonians themselves are interested in preserving their culture and identity. Considering this question in a broader context, it can be stated that the emphasis of one's ethnic identity has been a worldwide tendency for the past decades. This differs significantly from the preceding period in which the assimilation tendencies dominated. The basis for this kind of change is the explosive development of the global economy and information technology that permits economic activity based on ethnic ties and closer contacts between members of minority groups themselves as well as with the respective country of their origin.

Estonia is also no exception in this respect. It is apparent from the data of Figure 5 that the preservation of their ethnic identity is important for two thirds of Estonian Russians, whereas only every tenth among them is in favour of assimilation. It became evident from the analysis considered above that favouring assimilation is associated with education and regions. The data in Figure 5 confirms that there is also a certain connection with age here. For young people, their own national culture is somewhat less important. It is important to note that the youngest age group also supports the assimilation model less in comparison to others. At the same time, 15% of the youngest age group regards most important participation in Western culture, which is a three times higher indicator than for the oldest age group.




Figure 5: Attitudes associated with the preservation of identity

In planning the study, we presumed that one factor that Estonian Russians can consider a certain kind of danger to their identity is the circumstance that their children are taught the Estonian language ever more actively and they interact socially ever more with Estonians. Analysis of the results of the monitoring study indicates that on the whole, about one third fear that their children can lose their connection with Russian culture, as the result of intensively learning the Estonian language. The majority does not agree with this and rather assumes positive consequences. They believe that their children will start to speak both Russian and Estonian equally well. The data from Figure 6 indicates that as age increases, the number of people who fear that Russian children will lose their connection with Russian culture by intensively interacting socially with Estonians increases. Analysis also indicates a connection with education – the previously mentioned fear is greater among the more educated, which alludes to the greater importance they place on ethnic identity.




Figure 6. ‘The children of non-Estonians are taught Estonian ever more actively, the children have friends among Estonians and they interact socially with Estonians. What kinds of consequences can this have?’

The preservation and support of minority cultures enlarges the cultural richness of society on the one hand, yet on the other hand, the coexistence of differences can also create many kinds of problems. In association with this, how different people consider the lifestyle and way of thinking of different nationalities to be, and to what extent they feel disturbed by this, was examined in the monitoring study. A large majority of Estonians perceive that their way of thinking differs from that of non-Estonians (79%). In the case of Estonian Russians, the corresponding indicator is 68%. While Estonians with post-secondary education considered the lifestyle and way of thinking of Estonians to be similar to that of non-Estonians more in comparison to respondents with other levels of education, according to data from the monitoring study carried out three years ago, this difference has disappeared by now.

The data in Figure 7 describes the extent to which Estonians are disturbed by the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Russians by region. The most problematic region is Tallinn, where almost three fourths feel disturbed by this. This indicator falls between 50-60% elsewhere in Estonia. Analysis indicates that one of the primary factors that disturbs Estonians is the deficient proficiency in Estonian of non-Estonians. The lack of proficiency in Estonian of non-Estonians does not at all disturb only 18% of Estonians. It disturbs 47% a little and 34% intensely. The youngest age group of Estonians feels more disturbed than older age groups by the lack of proficiency in Estonian of non-Estonians. One reason for this is presumably that their own knowledge of Russian is the weakest.




Figure 7: Disturbance felt by Estonians due to the different kind of behaviour and lifestyle of Russians in terms of place of residence

4. Identity and Association with the World Abroad

The way a person associates himself and his country with the world abroad and above all in relations with its neighbours is an important indicator of national identity. This aspect of identity is especially important in a small country like Estonia.

In planning the study, we presumed that Estonian and Russian-language respondents see issues abroad, associated with identity, relatively differently, as a result of different experiences in life. These are attitudes that depend on the fate in life of every particular person and in this sense this sphere can be categorised under the private sphere, where different opinions are inevitable. At the same time, the sphere under consideration is very much associated with existential questions for both the individual and the country, and in this sense also belongs to the public sphere. The latter, however, requires the consensus of society at least in fundamental questions. The following analysis demonstrates that this unfortunately is still missing in Estonia.

First we consider the attitudes of Estonian Russians associated with the perception of homeland and regional identification with both the West and the East. About half of Estonian Russians consider Estonia their homeland. If we add those who consider both Estonia and Russia to be their homeland simultaneously, the corresponding percentage increases to 70%. One fourth of Estonian Russians consider Russia to be their homeland, whereas Figure 8 indicates that there is a strong regional connection here. There are considerably more Estonian Russians in Tallinn who consider Russia to be their homeland compared to other regions. It is important to note that in spite of its geographic location, Tallinn surpasses even the corresponding indicators of Eastern Viru County, which once again indicates that integration processes proceed differently in different regions in Estonia, and that Tallinn is the most problematic place in the sense of progress in integration.

Analysis also indicates a strong connection to age in the perception of one's homeland, which is natural considering the differing life experiences of different age groups and actual personal contact with Russia. While 72% of Estonian Russian respondents from the 15-24 age group consider Estonia to be their homeland, then the corresponding percentages are 54% of the 25-39 age group, 49% of the 40-54 age group and 23% of the 55-74 age group. An analogous difference in the opposite direction exists in regard to considering Russia their homeland.




Figure 8: ‘Which country do you consider your homeland?’

Next we will compare the regional identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians in relation to the West, meaning in association with the Nordic countries and Europe. As expected, the sense of identity of Estonians with these regions is greater. While 82% among Estonians consider themselves to belong among the Nordic peoples, and 82% of Estonian respondents feel they belong among Europeans, the corresponding percentages of Estonian Russians are 54% and 59% (see Figure 9).




Figure 9: ‘Which group do you feel that you belong to?’

We also studies the Eastern-oriented identity of Estonian Russians with the question, ‘Would it be more beneficial for Ukraine to belong to Russia’s sphere of influence or that of the European Union in your opinion?’ The results demonstrate that the understanding of Estonians and Estonian Russians in this respect differ fundamentally. While the majority of Estonians see the interests of Ukraine more in the European Union, the majority of Estonian Russians see them more in Russia. It can be presumed that this is an appraisal not so much of an isolated phenomenon as of a broader characteristic of the identity of Estonian Russians. While in their case the primary factor regarding the given question is their personal cultural and also historical connection to Russia, in the case of Estonians it is rather the existential fear of possible interference by Russia, generated by recent history. Answers to the question, ‘How important in your opinion will the influence of Russia be in the subsequent development of Estonia?’ also confirm the latter. These responses indicate that entirely two thirds of Estonians find that Russia will continue to influence subsequent developments in Estonia either to a great degree or at least to a significant degree. In the case of Estonian Russians, the corresponding percentage is significantly below 50%.




Figure 10: ‘In your opinion, would it be more beneficial for Ukraine to belong to Russia’s sphere of influence or that of the European Union?’

The traditional question by which the similarity or difference in the understandings of Estonians and Estonian Russians in questions concerning the foundations of Estonian statehood has been measured in integration monitoring studies is associated with the events of 1940 in Estonia. The monitoring study demonstrates that most Estonian Russians believe that Estonia voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, whereas according to the data in Figure 11, this percentage has even increased in comparison to the preceding monitoring study of 2002. Analysis indicates that also in the case of this question, a certain regional connection exists. While the number of people in Tallinn, who consider Estonia’s incorporation into the USSR to be voluntary, extends to nearly two thirds, less than half of the respondents in Eastern Viru County feel the same way. These numbers also refer to the specific nature of Tallinn in the context of integration and the need to deal with questions of integration at the local level as well.




Figure 11: ‘Did Estonia join the USSR voluntarily in the summer of 1940 or did the USSR occupy Estonia?’

On the whole, it can be said that the difference in the identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians concerning the world abroad refers once more to the complicated and long-term nature of the integration process in Estonia. Considering the extent to which the respective attitudes belong to the public sphere of Estonian society, they need to achieve a certain elementary unity. Presently, the situation is from time to time as if different communities figuratively speaking pull the chariot of state in different directions. From the standpoint of the sustainability of the state, this is a phenomenon to which much more attention should be paid than has been the case thus far. In doing so, however, it should be taken into account that the corresponding attitudes of people also clearly belong to the private sphere, because they have evolved in the course of their personal life experiences. Vigorous intervention by the state into this will cause more bad than good. This is a case of long-term adaptation that is influenced among other factors by relations between Estonia and Russia at governmental levels. The reasons for many of the integration problems considered in this report should be sought from this direction.

The conclusion is that the integration of Estonian society is not only a bilateral, but rather at least a trilateral process. In addition to increasing the unity of the public sphere of society and increasing tolerance regarding cultural differences, this also requires improvement in relations between Estonia and Russia. The latter inevitably influences the first two processes, and without this it is difficult to expect success in integration as a whole.